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The global agenda set at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in 
Cairo called upon researchers and program implementers to address the effects of gender 
inequality, especially the way inequality shapes sexual and reproductive health and demographic 
processes. Since then, researchers have documented links between women’s relative 
disadvantage and negative sexual and reproductive health outcomes. Less attention has been 
given to the systems of belief, or gender ideologies, that legitimate ongoing gender inequality. 
Yet, gender inequality would be unsustainable without supporting beliefs and values that define 
men and women as different and unequal. Those ideational aspects of gender systems—beliefs, 
values, attitudes, and norms—are the subject of this dissertation. The three empirical chapters 
investigate trends in attitudes concerning gender relations or connections between those attitudes 
and health and demographic behaviors. The first paper examines worldwide trends in attitudes 
about violence against women. Women in low-income countries have recently become less 
likely to justify intimate partner violence. The paper documents evidence that global cultural 
influences may be largely responsible for the observed trend in individual gender attitudes. The 
second paper uses survey data to test associations between men’s gender attitudes and their risk 
of HIV in Malawi. The analyses show that men with more egalitarian gender attitudes engage 
less frequently in sexual behaviors that involve risk of HIV transmission and report lower self-
assessed risk of HIV. Finally, the third paper employs qualitative data from Malawi to explore 
the relevance of ideas about gender to men’s fertility. The paper demonstrates that gender norms
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are imbued with ideals relevant to men’s fertility preferences and behaviors. Each paper begins 
from the premise that ideational factors, such as social norms and individual attitudes, play an 
important role in shaping behavior, and are central to the perpetuation of gender inequality. All 
three papers use different measures of ideas about gender and all three posit that attention to 






In recent decades, worldwide gender inequality has garnered considerable international attention. 
The global agenda set at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in 
Cairo called upon researchers and program implementers to address the effects of gender 
inequality, especially the way inequality shapes sexual and reproductive health and demographic 
processes (United Nations 1994). Since then, a large body of literature has documented the 
influence of gender systems on reproductive health (Blanc 2001; Mason 2001; Varga 2003; Li 
2004; Dodoo and Frost 2008). Much of this literature focuses on the association between 
women’s relative disadvantage, or lack of autonomy, and negative health outcomes (Dyson and 
Moore 1983; Greene and Biddlecom 2000; Beegle et al. 2001; Furuta and Salway 2006). 
Generally, these studies focus on the effects of women’s structural disadvantages, such as lower 
educational attainment, limited access to resources, constrained decision-making power, and 
restricted mobility.  
To date, there has been less attention given to the ideological aspects of gender systems, 
that is, the beliefs and values that support gender inequality. Gender inequality is built on the 
premise of gender differentiation—the assignment of roles, rights, resources, and responsibilities 
based on gender. The socially constructed expectations defining differences between men and 
women are the basis of gender inequality. As explained by Ridgeway and Correll, “If gender is a
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system for constituting difference and organizing inequality on the basis of that difference, then 
the widely held cultural beliefs that define the distinguishing characteristics of men and women 
and how they are expected to behave clearly are a central component of that system” (2004:511). 
The uneven distribution of resources between men and women certainly affects people’s life 
chances. At the same time, that inequality would be unsustainable without a supporting system of 
beliefs and values that legitimates the inequality.  
This dissertation examines ideational aspects of gender systems. The three empirical 
chapters investigate either trends in attitudes concerning gender differentiation or relationships 
between those attitudes and health and demographic outcomes. The first paper examines 
worldwide trends in attitudes about violence against women. The second paper uses survey data 
to test associations between men’s gender attitudes and their risk of HIV in Malawi. Finally, the 
third paper employs qualitative data from Malawi to explore the relevance of masculinity 
schemas to men’s fertility preferences and behaviors. Each paper begins from the premise that 
ideational factors, such as social norms and individual attitudes, play an important role in 
shaping behavior, and are central to the perpetuation of gender inequality. All three papers use 
different measures of ideas about gender and all three posit that attention to these ideational 
elements is crucial to understanding individual motivations for health and demographic 
behaviors. 
 
Worldwide Gender Inequality 
Despite recent worldwide efforts to reduce gender inequality, evidence of women’s relative 
disadvantage remains abundant. Promoting gender equality and empowering women was one of 
eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) established by the international community in 
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2000. The 2013 MDG progress report notes that much work remains to be done in this arena: 
“whether it is in the public or private sphere, women continue to be denied opportunities to 
participate in decisions that affect their lives” (United Nations 2013:23). Likewise, the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap report from 2012 concludes that large gaps remain 
between men and women in economic and political participation (Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi 
2012). Recent studies find that only 48 percent of women of working age are employed, 
compared with 73 percent of men (United Nations 2013). Also, worldwide only approximately 
21 percent of the seats in national parliaments are occupied by women (United Nations 2013).  
Since the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994, 
global consensus recognizes that reducing gender inequality is central to achieving goals for 
reducing maternal mortality, providing universal access to reproductive healthcare, and 
combatting the spread of HIV/AIDS (United Nations 1994). Global monitoring shows that these 
goals also remain far from being met. The maternal mortality ratio is 240 deaths per 100,000 live 
births for low-income countries, still nearly twice the 2015 MDG target. In some regions, 
progress has been especially inadequate, such as sub-Saharan Africa where the ratio is 500 
deaths per 100,000 live births (United Nations 2013). Also, while the rate of new HIV infections 
is on the decline, more than 60 percent of the people newly infected with HIV in 2011 were 
women (United Nations 2013). While these statistics are not evidence of gender inequality in 
themselves, scholars and policy makers agree that reproductive health targets will not be met 
until gender inequality is reduced (United Nations 1994).  
Another detrimental effect of gender inequality is high levels of violence against women. 
According to a recent study by the World Health Organization, approximately 35 percent of 
women worldwide have experienced physical or sexual violence at the hands of an intimate 
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partner or sexual violence committed by a non-partner (Garcia-Moreno et al. 2013). Violence 
against women both perpetuates and is perpetuated by gender inequality. The report’s authors 
highlight a need to “address the economic and sociocultural factors that foster a culture of 
violence against women” (Garcia-Moreno et al. 2013:3). They also note that, “acts of violence 
against women are not isolated events but rather form a pattern of behavior that violates the 
rights of women and girls, limits their participation in society, and damages their health and 
well-being” (Garcia-Moreno et al. 2013:1). The high rate of violence against women is visceral 
evidence of the negative effects of gender inequality. 
 The overwhelming evidence of gender inequality inspires this research on the systems of 
belief that support these negative outcomes. The focus of this dissertation is on individuals in 
low-income countries because gender inequality often has the most detrimental effects in the 
world’s poorest communities, where many people face already limited life chances. The results 
presented in the three empirical chapters have implications for sociologists interested in the role 
of ideational aspects of gender systems in perpetuating inequality, for demographers examining 
motivations for the behaviors that affect population health and demographics, and for 
policymakers who wish to improve health and demographic outcomes in their populations.  
 
Gender Schemas: Key Concepts of the Dissertation 
As described above, understanding the ideational elements of gender systems is essential for 
understanding how and why gender inequality is perpetuated. There are many terms for the 
ideational components of gender systems. The title of this dissertation references gender 
ideologies, which is intended as an umbrella term for all ideational aspects of gender systems. 
The empirical chapters refer specifically to gender schemas, gender attitudes, and masculinity 
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schemas. The following provides a brief overview of each of these concepts. Drawing on the 
work of Sewell (1992), Johnson-Hanks and colleagues (2011:2) define schemas as “often taken-
for-granted ways of perceiving and acting through which we make sense of the world and 
motivate our actions.” Schemas are collective in nature. Extending this definition, gender 
schemas are shared mental representations, such as values and beliefs about how men and 
women should behave and how they should relate, that inform people’s understanding of the 
world around them and their determinations of how to act in the world. They are both models of 
the world and models for the world, informing people’s goals, interpretations of the actions of 
others, behavioral choices, and justifications of their own conduct (Thornton, Axinn, Fricke, and 
Alwin 2001). Gender schemas inform our beliefs about the differences between men and women, 
our evaluations of the kinds of behaviors that are appropriate for men versus women, and our 
expectations for relationships between men and women. 
Gender attitudes are individual evaluations of common gender schemas. Individuals can 
hold relatively more or less egalitarian gender attitudes. Those who reject gender schemas that 
reinforce male superiority and dominance have comparatively egalitarian gender attitudes. Many 
gender schemas exist within any one social context and they are often contradictory. Also, the 
extent to which any given gender schema is endorsed in a population can change over time. 
These features of gender schemas are also true of gender attitudes at the individual level. 
Individuals hold multiple, and often conflicting, gender attitudes. And, an individual’s gender 
attitudes may change over time.   
The dissertation also includes discussion of masculinity schemas, which are one type of 
gender schema. Masculinity schemas are socially constructed expectations for what it means to 
be a man and what types of behavior are appropriate for men. Men enact available schemas to 
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build their sense of manhood and to perform their masculinity for others. Research has shown 
that masculinity schemas provide mental maps for action based on expectations for and 
evaluations of how men should behave (Campbell 1997; Walker 2005; Simpson 2007; Izugbara 
and Undie 2008; Macia, Maharaj, and Gresh 2011; Townsend et al. 2011). Like all gender 
schemas, conceptions of masculinity vary across time and social contexts (Morrell 1998; Morrell 
2001; Pattman 2001; Silberschmidt 2001; Reid and Walker 2005; Hunter 2010). Also, multiple 
masculinity schemas exist within any one social context (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). A 
man’s ability to enact a particular masculinity schema will depend on his access to the required 
materials and resources, as well as the ability of others in his social network to recognize the 
schema that he is invoking with his behavior (Morrell 2001). These conditions are unevenly 
distributed both within and between societies.  
The concepts of gender schemas, gender attitudes, and masculinity schemas are used 
throughout the dissertation. The following section provides a brief overview of how these 
concepts are investigated in each of the empirical chapters. 
 
Gender Schemas through Three Empirical Lenses 
The three empirical chapters of this dissertation investigate gender schemas in different ways and 
using different kinds of data. Each chapter brings together sociological literature and theory on 
gender with demographic methods and/or topics of inquiry. The chapters examine gender 
schemas in relation to three topics that are central to contemporary social demographic research: 
diffusion of cultural norms, HIV risk, and fertility. They contribute to a broader research agenda 
among demographers who recognize the importance of cultural and ideational influences, in 
addition to economic and social structural factors, for demographic processes (Montgomery and 
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Casterline 1996; Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Kertzer 1997; Barber and Axinn 2004; Thornton 
2001; Casterline 2001; Thornton 2005; Jayakody et al. 2008). Together, the three chapters 
suggest that research on the ideational elements of gender systems can enhance our 
understanding of how gender inequality is perpetuated or undermined, and how gender 
inequality can influence the outcomes of a variety of major social processes.  
 Chapter 2, “Increasing Rejection of Intimate Partner Violence: Evidence of Global 
Cultural Diffusion,” uses survey data from 26 countries to examine trends in gender attitudes, 
specifically attitudes about intimate partner violence. The study builds on demographic research, 
especially studies of changing family patterns, which has long considered global ideational 
influences on individual-level attitudinal and behavior change (Cleland and Wilson 1987; 
Jayakody, Thornton, and Axinn 2008; Lesthaeghe 1983; Mason 1997; National Research 
Council 2001; Thornton 2001, 2005; Yount and Rashad 2008). The results show that recent 
increases in the rejection of intimate partner violence are consistent with the influence of 
diffusion of global cultural norms about violence against women. These findings provide 
evidence that global processes can influence the types of gender schema that are available to 
individuals and can play a role in shaping attitudes about those schemas. 
 Chapter 3, “Men’s Gender Attitudes and HIV Risk,” uses quantitative and qualitative 
data from a 2011 study in urban Malawi to examine the association between men’s gender 
attitudes and their objective and subjective risk of HIV. Existing research on the link between 
gender attitudes and HIV is predominantly based on qualitative data. Previous studies have 
revealed that sexual behaviors are a common social domain for the enactment of masculinity 
schemas (Silberschmidt 2001; Williams 2003; Hunter 2005; Wyrod 2011). Some studies of 
gender schemas and HIV risk demonstrate that men who believe in male dominance in intimate 
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relationships and who believe that “real men” have lots of sex are likely to aspire to having 
multiple sexual partners as proof of their masculinity, thereby putting themselves and their 
partners at risk of HIV (Silberschmidt 2001; Walker 2005; Simpson 2007; Hunter 2010; Macia et 
al. 2011; Odimegwu et al. 2013). Other research highlights men who have reacted to evidence of 
the detrimental effects of HIV and violence against women by attempting to construct 
masculinity schemas rooted in equal gender relations (Morrell 2001; Sideris 2004; Lynch, 
Brouard, and Visser 2010; Dworkin et al. 2012). This existing research documents varying levels 
of endorsement of popular gender schemas, but few studies have quantitatively tested whether 
that variation is related to differences in sexual health outcomes. To fill that gap, the second 
empirical chapter draws on the tools of program implementers (Pulerwitz and Barker 2008; 
Barker et al. 2010) to quantitatively examine the relationship between gender attitudes and 
behaviors associated with HIV risk. The findings indicate that, as expected, Malawian men with 
more egalitarian gender attitudes engage less frequently in sexual behaviors implicated in HIV 
risk. The chapter also includes an examination of the relationship between gender attitudes and 
self-assessed HIV risk and finds that men with more egalitarian gender attitudes tend to feel less 
at risk of HIV. Overall, the findings are consistent with the expectation that gender schemas are 
relevant to studies of HIV risk behaviors, and to reproductive health more generally.  
Chapter 4, “ ‘A Real Man is Recognized by What he Does’: Schemas of Masculinity and 
Fertility,” highlights the fact that the potential influence of masculinity schemas has been 
overlooked in fertility research. Using qualitative data from urban Malawi, this chapter 
investigates masculinity schemas as a source of cultural scripts available to guide men’s fertility. 
The analysis documents three masculinity schemas that establish social expectations that are 
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relevant to fertility behaviors: men are expected to, 1) father at least one child; 2) deliver the 
financial means to feed, clothe, and school their children; and 3) be sexually active.  
The chapter shows that contemporary masculinity schemas in urban Malawi contain elements 
that are relevant to men’s fertility preferences and behaviors. The results suggest that greater 
attention to gender schemas could enhance our understanding of motivations for men’s fertility 
preferences and behaviors.  
 Chapter 5 is the conclusion to the dissertation. It provides reflection on the broader 
lessons learned from each paper and offers suggestions for future research. The conclusion 
highlights the fact that the findings from each of the dissertation’s empirical analyses inspire 




Increasing Rejection of Intimate Partner Violence:  
Evidence of Global Cultural Diffusion1 
 
Introduction 
A large literature explores the role of global norms in defining appropriate action for nation-
states (Meyer et al. 1997). Most studies focus on changes to national policies in response to the 
transnational normative pressures of world society. This study extends world society theory by 
examining the diffusion of global norms to nonelite individuals. Normative global scripts, such 
as human rights, are not solely available to national governments. To the contrary, global norms 
also provide moralized guidelines for individual behavior (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). To 
capture the extent of world society’s influence, it is important to go beyond studies of policy 
change.  
Recent transnational advocacy and development programming on issues of violence 
against women provide an interesting and important case for examining the influence of world 
society on individual attitudes. This study examines trends in attitudes about intimate partner 
violence; this form of violence against women is commonly defined as “any behavior within an 
intimate relationship that causes physical, psychological, or sexual harm to those in the 
relationship” (Heise and Garcia-Moreno 2002:89). It often occurs in private as part of personal
                                                
1 A version of this chapter appeared as: Pierotti, Rachael S. 2013. “Increasing Rejection of Intimate Partner 
Violence: Evidence of Global Cultural Diffusion.” American Sociological Review 78(2):240-265. 
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relationships and, as such, may be particularly resistant to external pressures, which makes it a 
good case for examination of global influences. Also, norms about interpersonal relationships (as 
opposed to norms about institutional arrangements such as the structure of education systems) 
are relevant to all individuals, irrespective of social position. Finally, rapid dissemination of 
global norms about violence against women began in the mid-1990s and accelerated in the first 
decade of the 2000s. This timeframe means one can use recent survey data to examine whether 
attitudes became more consistent with world society’s cultural scripts as those scripts were 
disseminated.  
If dissemination of global norms is affecting individuals worldwide, the proportion of 
people who view intimate partner violence as legitimate should be declining. I test this 
hypothesis using nationally representative data on women’s attitudes in 26 countries, all the 
countries for which relevant data were available at two time points. I then combine demographic 
theories and methods with world society theories about the dissemination of cultural scripts to 
derive and test explanations for aggregate-level trends in attitudes about intimate partner 
violence.  
I find that within the first decade of the 2000s, women in 23 of 26 countries became more 
likely to reject intimate partner violence as a justifiable form of social control. Moreover, this 
aggregate trend was due to a rapid increase in the likelihood of rejecting intimate partner 
violence among women of all ages, women with various levels of education and access to media, 
and women in urban and rural areas. This suggests the change was mostly due to the wide 
dissemination of global cultural scripts. Structural socioeconomic and demographic shifts in the 




World society theory holds that the global arena is more than political and economic exchanges 
among states (Meyer et al. 1997). World society is a distinct social space constituted by 
interactions among transnational actors, especially intergovernmental organizations, such as the 
United Nations, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including advocacy 
groups, professional associations, and charities with global reach (Boli and Thomas 1997; Merry 
2006). World society actors are influential because of their ability to define and promote new 
cultural scripts and models of policy and activism (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Global cultural 
scripts draw on fundamental principles of world society to define appropriate behavior for 
individuals, organizations, and nation-states (Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer and Jepperson 
2000). 
Scholars have documented evidence of the influence of global models on a variety of 
national policy domains: human rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Koo and Ramirez 
2009), democracy (Torfason and Ingram 2010), environmental protection (Frank, Hironaka, and 
Schofer 2000), education (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992), population (Barrett and Tsui 
1999), women’s labor force participation (Berkovitch 1999a), women’s voting rights (Ramirez, 
Soysal, and Shanahan 1997), women’s political participation (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006), 
gender mainstreaming (True and Mintrom 2001), female circumcision (Boyle and Preves 2000), 
and criminal regulation of sex (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010). In each of these domains, 
access to global models proves a powerful predictor of national policy action. Moreover, 
dissemination of global cultural scripts explains increasing worldwide isomorphism in these 
policy domains. 
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The analysis presented here pushes beyond existing studies of policy change by testing 
whether individual-level attitudinal change is also consistent with the influence of global cultural 
scripts. Case studies from around the world demonstrate the complexities of when and how 
global norms are adopted, resisted, modified, and rejected by local actors working within their 
own cultural logics (Boyle 2002; Levitt and Merry 2009; Rubtsova 2011). These studies add 
great depth to our knowledge of the social processes that accompany the introduction of new 
cultural scripts. What the case study approach cannot detect, however, are broad trends that 
correspond with the articulation and diffusion of global cultural scripts (Frank, Hardinge, and 
Wosick-Correa 2009). That is the goal of this research. If world society norms exert power at the 
individual level as they do at the national policy level, we would expect the diffusion of global 
cultural scripts to produce relatively rapid changes in individual attitudes. 
Demographic research, especially studies of changing family patterns, has long 
considered global ideational influences on individual-level attitudinal and behavior change 
(Cleland and Wilson 1987; Jayakody, Thornton, and Axinn 2008; Lesthaeghe 1983; Mason 
1997; National Research Council 2001; Thornton 2001, 2005; Yount and Rashad 2008). The 
demographic literature describes mechanisms for the diffusion of global family models, 
including urbanization, education, and mass media, along with NGO outreach, government 
initiatives, development programs, and religious institutions (Thornton 2005). Scholars have also 
documented the role of these mechanisms in disseminating messages about women’s rights 
(Berkovitch 1999a; Merry 2006). I bring together world society theory and demographic theory 
about the diffusion of cultural models to derive hypotheses about aggregate-level trends in 
attitudes about intimate partner violence.  
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Figure 2.1 depicts the theorized pathways of influence linking global cultural scripts with 
individual attitudes. Diffusion mechanisms connect global cultural scripts directly to individuals 
and operate indirectly through national political actions. The dramatic growth in the number of 
women’s international NGOs and their efforts at cultural diffusion are largely credited with 
linking the global and the local (Berkovitch 1999b). In this model, both national policy and 
individual attitudes are affected by the diffusion of global cultural scripts. Attitudinal changes 
may be bolstered by policy action, but they do not depend on national legal changes. 
 
 
I simplified the model to emphasize the object of this study, and this requires some 
clarification. First, I build on the research described earlier that examines the influence of global 
models. The focus on vertical diffusion is not meant to deny that both policymakers (Chimbwete, 
Watkins, and Zulu 2005) and individuals (Boyle and Carbone-Lopez 2006; Htun and Weldon 
2012) have agency in shaping the dissemination and interpretation of global cultural scripts. 
Global Cultural Scripts about 
Violence Against Women 
National Policies that address 
Violence Against Women 
Individual Attitudes about Violence 
Against Women 
• International conferences 
• Donor pressure and incentives 
• Treaties and global normative pressures 
• NGO & activist mobilization 
• Media coverage of policy debates 
• Government initiatives 
• Policy (threat of) enforcement 
• Donor-funded programming 
• NGO outreach campaigns 




Figure 2.1: Pathways of Influence: Global Cultural Scripts to Individual Attitudes 
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Second, the present study does not include direct measures of individual links to world society 
and does not test the relative importance of each of these mechanisms. These mechanisms 
operate differently in different places. The effect of laws, for example, will vary depending on 
the socio-legal context and the salience of the formal legal system in people’s lives (Longhofer 
and Schofer 2010). Testing these mechanisms is outside the scope of this study, but I discuss 
them because they inform the hypotheses presented below. 
 
World Society Discourse and National Policies on Violence Against Women 
In the community of transnational women’s rights activism, violence against women is 
conceptualized as a human rights violation that results from and reinforces systems of gender 
inequality (United Nations 2008). Violence against women encompasses social practices such as 
intimate partner violence, sexual violence, sexual harassment, female circumcision, early or 
forced marriage, and human trafficking. Depicting violence against women as a unified category 
of meaning facilitates the interpretation of each social practice through the lens of gender 
inequality and women’s rights. For example, in the case of intimate partner violence, advocacy 
messages declare that wife beating is a rights violation that is never justified. 
The definition of violence against women is a cultural product; it is based on fundamental 
principles of world society, including universalism, liberal individualism, and equality 
(Berkovitch and Bradley 1999; Boli and Thomas 1997). National and international elites are 
encouraged to support the new legal and institutional structures because of the association 
between human rights and gender equality on the one hand, and modernity and development on 
the other hand (Berkovitch 1999a; Luke and Watkins 2002; Thompson 2002; Thornton 2001). 
Feminist movements in Western countries are an important source of legitimating ideology and 
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funding for efforts to highlight violence against women as a transnational issue. Global 
inequalities affect the construction of the definition of violence against women, but the current 
influence of global cultural norms cannot be reduced to the unilateral imposition of Western 
values. Dissemination of global cultural scripts depends on the participation of activists all over 
the world who vernacularize the global models into language that makes sense in each local 
context (Merry 2006).  
The dominant definition of violence against women is enshrined in transnational 
agreements and national laws. In 1979, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
which demanded changes not only in states’ practices, but also required states to ensure private 
entities in economic and social life did not discriminate against women (Thompson 2002). This 
declaration opened the door to discussions about violations of women’s rights in the private 
sphere.  
The debate about violence against women found its full expression at the 1994 
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the 1995 Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing. At the Cairo conference, gender equality and women’s rights 
were promoted on an international stage as key components of improving reproductive health. 
The Beijing conference built on the success of Cairo and produced a Platform for Action 
proclaiming that violence against women is a violation of women’s human rights (Tinker 2004).  
In 2008, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched a campaign called 
UNiTE to End Violence against Women. The campaign website called violence against women a 
“global pandemic” and quoted the Secretary-General saying, “there is one universal truth, 
applicable to all countries, cultures and communities: violence against women is never 
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acceptable, never excusable, never tolerable” (UNiTE 2012). Global prominence of the issue of 
violence against women has been increasing ever since the 1994 and 1995 conferences in Cairo 
and Beijing. Transnational activists and policymakers share well-established cultural scripts 
defining the problem, its scope, and its solutions. 
Evidence of the worldwide influence of global cultural scripts about violence against 
women is seen in patterns of national legal change. One study of rape law reform found that 
global forces propelled a wave of recent changes to rape laws (Frank et al. 2009). The changes 
reflected global norms that categorize rape as a violation of individual liberty, rights, and 
equality. Another study credited global forces with inducing national governments to criminalize 
female circumcision (Boyle and Preves 2000).  
I gathered information from the United Nations Secretary-General’s online database on 
violence against women to examine whether there is also a global pattern in the enactment of 
national policies addressing intimate partner violence.2 The findings, presented in Figure 2.2, are 
striking. Since 1975, 119 different countries worldwide have enacted approximately 260 
national-level legal changes—new legislation, amended legislation, executive decrees, and 
constitutional provisions—to address intimate partner violence. Nearly 95 percent of those 
changes occurred since the 1995 Beijing conference.3 Worldwide similarity in the timing of these 
reforms is noteworthy. The trend suggests that national governments across the globe responded 
to pressures and incentives to address violence against women. 
 
                                                
2 The online database is located at http://webapps01.un.org/vawdatabase/about.action. I collected information from 
the database from November 2011 through February 2012. 
3 Although it is plausible that reporting of national policies regarding violence against women improved as global 
attention to this issue grew, it is unlikely that the dramatic increase in the number of policy actions can be entirely 




All countries included in the present study implemented legal or policy changes since 
1995 to prohibit, prevent, or punish violence against women. Twelve countries enacted new 
legislation specific to addressing intimate partner violence: Bolivia (1995), Cambodia (2005), 
Dominican Republic (1997), Egypt (1998), Ghana (2007), India (2006), Indonesia (2004), 
Malawi (2006), Nepal (2009), Turkey (1998), Uganda (2009), and Zimbabwe (2007). Another 
10 countries passed legislation or amended existing legislation regarding other forms of violence 
against women: Armenia (2003), Benin (2003, 2006), Ethiopia (2004), Kenya (2006), 
Madagascar (2000, 2005), Philippines (2004), Rwanda (2008), Senegal (1999), Tanzania (1998), 
and Zambia (2005). In Haiti (2008), Jordan (2004), Mali (2006), and Nigeria (2007), national 
governments have gotten as far as issuing policies regarding violence against women.  
In summary, during the late 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, cultural scripts that 
identified violence against women as a human rights violation became increasingly 
institutionalized within world society. A variety of world society actors, including NGOs and 
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Figure 2.2: Worldwide Cumulative Number of Policy 
Actions that Address Intimate Partner Violence 
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policies addressing violence against women is evidence of the broad diffusion and national-level 
influence of this global cultural script. In the analyses that follow, I examine whether individual 
attitudes also became more consistent with global cultural scripts during this time period. In so 
doing, I test whether world society theory can be usefully applied to understanding trends in 
individual attitudes. 
 
Global Norms and Individual Attitudes 
The analysis has three parts. I begin by investigating patterns in attitudinal trends. Second, I test 
mechanisms of diffusion of global cultural scripts as predictors of individual attitudes in cross-
sectional analyses. Finally, I examine several potential explanations for the aggregate trends. In 
this section, I present hypotheses for each part of the analysis. 
 
Aggregate Trends 
First, I examine whether individual attitudes are becoming more consistent with cultural scripts 
of world society. Despite international elites’ and national policymakers’ heightened attention to 
violence against women, it is conceivable that global cultural scripts never reach nonelite women 
who are not engaged in transnational activism. Existing literature leads to skepticism regarding 
individual access to global cultural scripts. World society scholars have documented decoupling 
between national policies based on global cultural models and implementation of those policies 
(Meyer et al. 1997). Furthermore, in legally pluralistic societies, such as many of the countries in 
this study, the formal legal system or transnational principles of human rights may not be salient 
cultural frameworks in people’s everyday lives.  
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In world society, the consensus is that a husband’s physical abuse of his wife is part of a 
broader social system that reinforces gender inequality. For individual survey respondents, 
however, the meaning of violent acts may be affected by more immediate concerns, such as the 
interactional context and individual behaviors (Heise 1998). If individuals are unaware of the 
global discourse about violence against women or find it irrelevant to their lives, there is no 
reason to anticipate consistent trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence.  
On the other hand, global norms may have symbolic power, independent of national 
governments’ translation of those norms. National and international discourse may be a cultural 
resource, enabling individuals to change how they perceive and evaluate violent acts. As Levitt 
and Merry (2009:447) note, “that women’s rights are codified into law endows them with 
authority and connects them to the state, even though few women turn to formal legal arenas to 
redress their grievances.” Local elite activists gain legitimacy and access to resources by using 
global norms to justify their work (Tsutsui and Shin 2008); these activists then further 
disseminate global cultural scripts. 
Moreover, access to global norms about violence against women is facilitated by the 
work of many types of actors. Education systems, media, international donor programming, 
NGOs, and religious organizations also disseminate global cultural scripts. NGOs and 
development programs distribute printed materials, sponsor public discussions, and offer training 
to local professionals and community groups on issues of gender equality and violence against 
women. For example, during 2005 to 2007, a United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) women’s rights program in Benin printed and distributed 15,000 
booklets explaining women’s rights, placed 2,000 posters about women’s rights in city halls, 
produced films on women’s rights and broadcast them to an estimated 20,000 individuals, 
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reached nearly 7,000 people through public meetings in rural communities, and trained local 
paralegals, health professionals, civil authorities, and teachers (USAID Women’s Legal Rights 
Initiative 2007). This example is only one of many such development programs during the past 
decade.  
As described earlier, the diffusion of global cultural scripts about violence against women 
began in earnest in the late 1990s and intensified throughout the 2000s. With the widespread 
diffusion of global cultural scripts, I hypothesize that individual attitudes are becoming more 
consistent with prescriptions of world society: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Within each country, women are more likely to reject intimate 
partner violence in the mid- to late-2000s than earlier in that decade.  
 
After testing this hypothesis, additional sensitivity analyses will assess whether attitudinal trends 
were similar among married and unmarried women, and among men.  
 
Mechanisms of Diffusion: Predictors of Attitudes about Intimate Partner Violence 
World society theory predicts that people most closely connected to the global institutional 
environment will be most likely to reflect the values promoted in that environment (Meyer 
2010). Previous research in sub-Saharan Africa on attitudes about intimate partner violence 
confirms this prediction: on average, people in urban areas, those with more education, and those 
with greater access to media are more likely to reject intimate partner violence (Uthman, 
Lawoko, and Moradi 2009). If the dissemination of global norms about violence against women 
is at least partly responsible for individual attitudes, we should find a cross-sectional association 
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between access to messages emanating from the world cultural environment and attitudes about 
intimate partner violence.  
I test the influence of three mechanisms of global norm diffusion: urban residence, 
education, and access to media. Urban centers are often sites of social change (Ryder 1965). 
Residents of urban areas are more likely to be familiar with global norms because of their 
relative proximity to the elite organizations and individuals who disseminate those ideas. Also, 
people in urban areas live in socially heterogeneous environments and are exposed to a wide 
variety of life styles in terms of social class, cultural and religious orientations, and political 
ideologies. Access to education and media has similar effects of expanding horizons and 
increasing exposure to global scripts (Hornik and McAnany 2001). In many countries, messages 
about women’s rights, gender equality, and problems of violence against women are explicitly 
discussed in school curricula and in media programming. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals with greater access to global discourse through urban 
residence, education, or access to media are more likely to reject intimate partner 
violence than those with more limited access to the global discourse.  
 
Explanations for the Aggregate Trend 
From theories of diffusion, demographers have proposed two explanations for aggregate-level 
trends in attitudes: attitudinal shifts within existing population groups and changes in population 
composition (Firebaugh 1992). Changes within population groups are consistent with widespread 
diffusion of cultural models and rapid aggregate-level change. Population compositional changes 
occur as some subgroups grow in relative size and become a larger proportion of the population. 
Attitudinal trends due to population compositional shifts are the result of more narrow cultural 
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diffusion and should produce more gradual change. Analyses of the demographic processes 
driving attitudinal change thus provide further tests about whether these trends are consistent 
with the widespread influence of global cultural scripts.  
I take two approaches to understanding attitudinal trends. First, I investigate the extent to 
which changes in population composition—in terms of urban living, education, and media 
access—explain the change in attitudes about intimate partner violence. Second, I examine how 
much of the observed trend is due to attitudinal changes within birth cohorts measured in both 
survey waves versus change due to replacement in the survey population of older cohorts by 
younger cohorts, who are more likely to reject intimate partner violence. 
Increasing urban living, education, and media access. Assuming that tests of Hypothesis 
2 show that people in urban areas with more education and media access are more likely to reject 
intimate partner violence, the next question is to what extent changes in population composition 
account for the aggregate-level trend in attitudes about intimate partner violence. Most of these 
countries’ populations are becoming more urban and have increasing access to education and 
media. Some of the observed changes in attitudes, therefore, may result from changing 
population composition.  
Although I expect changes in urban living, education, and media access to explain some 
of the attitudinal change, I anticipate that the broad dissemination of global cultural scripts 
produced a shift in attitudes that is greater and more rapid than what is explained by population 
compositional changes. Urban living, education, and media access increase exposure to global 
norms, but these are not the only ways of gaining access to global cultural scripts. Messages are 
also disseminated through personal networks and diffused through many other mechanisms by 
agents of world society. These efforts to diffuse global norms have the potential to lead to 
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attitudinal change within population groups defined by place of residence, education, and media 
access—change that is above and beyond shifts due to differences in population composition. 
Tests of this hypothesis will evaluate whether patterns of attitudinal change are consistent with 
relatively broad dissemination of global cultural scripts.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Within-population group attitudinal shifts explain most of the 
change in the percent of women who reject intimate partner violence. Increased 
urban living, education, and media access (compositional change) explain only a 
small part of the aggregate trend.  
  
Within-cohort change and cohort replacement. Social scientists often look to cohort 
replacement as an explanation for social change (Alwin 1990; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; 
Ryder 1965). Cohort replacement suggests that social change occurs as younger generations with 
distinct beliefs and values replace older generations in the population. A main assumption of 
cohort replacement theory is that individuals’ attitudes are formed early in life and remain 
relatively stable over their life course.  
An alternative model of social change assumes that individuals change their attitudes as 
adults (Alwin 1990). That adults may change their opinions is the operating assumption of 
activists and development practitioners who expend resources attempting to change how 
individuals think about violence against women. This is within-cohort change and it may result 
from aging—as respondents get older their opinions change—or from period effects—if there is 
something different about later periods that causes people to change their opinions.  
Transnational dissemination of global cultural scripts about violence against women 
influences both the context in which new generations are socialized and the cultural context in 
which already socialized adults make meaning of their actions and interactions. I hypothesize 
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that both types of change will be operative, but within-cohort change will explain more of the 
observed trend. If the cause of the aggregate-level trends were limited to cohort replacement, it 
would mean either that only young people have exposure to global cultural scripts on violence 
against women (perhaps through school), or that only young people are receptive to those 
messages. Given the variety of mechanisms of diffusion of global cultural scripts, I expect 
people of all ages to have access to those scripts. And, while it is conceivable that older women 
are somewhat more resistant to external cultural influences, global cultural scripts should be 
powerful enough to influence people during all periods of the life course.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Within-cohort attitudinal shifts explain most of the change in the 
percent of women who reject intimate partner violence. Cohort replacement 
explains only a small part of the aggregate trend. 
 
Data 
Data for this study come from 52 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) datasets, including 
two from each of 26 countries.4 All countries with two waves of DHS data on women’s attitudes 
about intimate partner violence are included in the analysis. These countries are Armenia, Benin, 
Bolivia, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Half of the countries with data meeting the 
inclusion criteria are in sub-Saharan Africa. As such, inclusion or exclusion of variables and 
models from the analyses is largely driven by their relevance in the African context. Nonetheless, 
                                                
4 DHS data are available for download at http://www.measuredhs.com/data/. 
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although not representative of the globe, these data come from a wide range of low- and middle-
income countries.  
The datasets come from nationally representative, repeated cross-sectional surveys. In 
each country, the first wave of data collection was in the early- to mid-2000s and the second was 
in the mid- to late-2000s. For most countries, the two waves of data collection were five years 
apart. The shortest interval between waves was three years in Egypt and the longest was seven 
years in India. Table 2.1 shows survey years and sample sizes for each of the 26 countries. The 
timing of these data collections corresponds with the period of increasing global attention to 
issues of violence against women.5 
Sampling for each DHS study was conducted by randomly selecting primary sampling 
units (PSUs) and then randomly sampling households within selected PSUs. In most countries, 
all women between the ages of 15 and 49 years were eligible to participate. In Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, and Turkey, only ever-married women were eligible.6 This 
inconsistency in sampling is one reason results are comparable within country and across time 
but not across countries. All analyses use sampling weights to adjust for variation in the 
probability of selection. 
 
  
                                                
5 Ideally, wave 1 data for each country would have been collected before the diffusion of global scripts about 
violence against women, but such data are not available. The collection of data on attitudes about violence against 
women is itself part of world society activism on this issue. Despite the timing of data collection, however, it is clear 
that violence against women gained prominence at the level of world society before there was coordinated 
worldwide mobilization at the national and individual levels. Following institutionalization of the issue of violence 
against women in world society, local activism began influencing national and international responses, but the 
development and dissemination of a global cultural script facilitated this local mobilization. 
6 In cases where the sample consisted of all women in one wave and ever-married women in the other wave, I 





The outcome variable derives from a question that asked respondents whether it is okay for a 
man to hit or beat his wife under certain circumstances. Specifically, the most common form of 
the question asked, “Sometimes a husband is annoyed or angered by things which his wife does. 
In your opinion, is a husband justified in hitting or beating his wife in the following situations?” 
The five scenarios presented to respondents were (1) if she goes out without telling him, (2) if 
she neglects the children, (3) if she argues with him, (4) if she refuses to have sex with him, and 
(5) if she burns the food. Given the sensitive nature of this survey question, differences in 
question wording have the potential to influence the distribution of responses. Based on research 
Year Sample Size Year Sample Size
Armenia 2005 6,566           2010 5,922           
Benin 2001 6,219           2006 17,794         
Bolivia 2003/04 17,654         2008 16,939         
Cambodia 2005/06 4,168           2010/11 18,754         
Dominican Rep. 2002 23,384         2007 27,195         
Egypt 2005 19,474         2008 16,527         
Ethiopia 2000 15,367         2005 14,070         
Ghana 2003 5,691           2008 4,916           
Haiti 2000 10,159         2005/06 10,757         
India 1998/99 90,303         2005/06 93,724         
Indonesia 2002/03 29,483         2007 32,895         
Jordan 2002 6,006           2007 10,876         
Kenya 2003 8,195           2008/09 8,444           
Madagascar 2003/04 7,949           2008/09 17,375         
Malawi 2000 13,220         2004/05 11,698         
Mali 2001 12,849         2006 14,583         
Nepal 2001/02 8,726           2006/07 8,640           
Nigeria 2003 7,620           2008 33,385         
Philippines 2003 13,633         2008 13,594         
Rwanda 2000 10,421         2005 11,321         
Senegal 2005 14,602         2010/11 15,688         
Tanzania 2004/05 10,329         2010 10,139         
Turkey 1998 6,152           2003/04 8,075           
Uganda 2000/01 7,246           2006 8,531           
Zambia 2001/02 7,658           2007 7,146           
Zimbabwe 1999 5,907           2005/06 8,907           
Table 2.1: Survey Years and Sample Sizes
Wave 1 Wave 2
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by Yount and colleagues (2011), I conducted an analysis of question wording and determined 
that small differences across surveys in eight countries could not account for the observed 
trends.7 Moreover, the findings presented below do not depend on the inclusion of the countries 
with question wording differences.  
There is some variation between countries, however, in the scenarios presented as 
potential justification for intimate partner violence. To ensure comparability within country and 
across time, only scenarios that were asked in both waves of data collection were included in the 
dependent variable. The dependent variable should not be compared across countries, however, 
because the scenarios are not the same in each country. The standard scenarios (listed earlier) 
were used in the dependent variable for 20 of the countries.8  
Examining trends in responses to each scenario individually provides interesting 
information about shifting criteria for the establishment of just cause for violence (Heise 1998). 
In this analysis, however, I am interested in the degree to which attitudes conform to global 
norms about violence against women, which emphasize rejection of all justifications for 
violence. For that reason, I created a dichotomous dependent variable that indicates whether the 
respondent broadly rejects wife beating. This variable is coded 1 for respondents who rejected all 
scenarios suggested by the survey interviewer as reasonable justification for a husband to beat 
                                                
7 There are small question wording differences across waves in eight countries. Based on Yount and colleagues’ 
(2011) findings, the wording differences may be causing an underestimate of the change over time in the Dominican 
Republic, India, and Turkey. Wording differences could be the source of some overestimation of the change over 
time in Rwanda and Senegal, although effects are likely to be small. Because of small sample sizes, Yount and 
colleagues (2011) were unable to estimate effects of the across-time wording variation found in Benin, Haiti, and 
Mali, although these effects are also likely to be small. (Analysis available from the author.) 
8 The India surveys excluded the third and fourth standard scenarios and included the following two scenarios 
instead: if she shows disrespect for in-laws and if he suspects her of being unfaithful. The Jordan surveys excluded 
the fourth standard scenario and included the following two additional scenarios: if she insults him and if she 
disobeys him. Nigeria included one extra scenario in both waves: if the food is not cooked on time. The first 
standard scenario was not asked in Turkey; instead, a scenario asked if she wastes money. Finally, in Cambodia the 
fifth scenario was excluded and in Zambia the first scenario was excluded, both because of variation in the wording 
of the scenario across survey waves. 
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his wife and 0 otherwise.9 For the sake of brevity, I will interpret this throughout the analysis as a 
rejection of intimate partner violence. Note that this is an over-simplification; some respondents 
may reject all of the suggested justifications but may believe there are other instances in which a 
husband is justified in beating his wife. Across the 52 datasets, an average of 51 percent of 
respondents rejected all scenarios. To ensure results are not an artifact of the dependent variable 
coding, I also conducted analyses using an additive scale (0 to 5) for the number of scenarios that 
a respondent deemed reasonable justification for intimate partner violence. Results (not shown) 
are largely consistent across specifications of the dependent variable. 
 
Predictors of Attitudes about Intimate Partner Violence 
The analyses require measures of several demographic characteristics. Urban residence, 
educational attainment, and media access are the three main variables of interest. Urban living is 
a dichotomous variable defined by the survey teams in each country. Educational attainment is 
coded as a categorical variable that captures the highest level of schooling attended by the 
respondent: no schooling, primary, secondary, or higher. Media access is a composite measure of 
access to newspapers, radio, and television. Respondents who came in contact with newspapers, 
radio, or television at least once per week were given a code of 1 for access to media. 
Respondents with less frequent access were coded 0.  
In addition to the main predictors, I tested several other variables for a relationship with 
attitudes about intimate partner violence. First, I included continuous measures of age and age-
squared in each model as controls. The analysis of cohort replacement closely examines the 
                                                
9 To be conservative, only respondents who answered no to each question were assigned a 1 on this dependent 
variable. Respondents who said “don’t know” in reply to any of the scenarios were coded 0. 
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effect of age on attitudes about intimate partner violence. I also investigated the role of wealth. 
Wealth may increase access to national and international elites who participate in global culture 
and provide means for social engagement outside the home. Wealth may therefore serve as an 
additional mechanism of diffusion of global culture.  
Given the populations under study, it is difficult to measure wealth, and available 
measures indicate a large amount of clumping on the poor end of the wealth scale, especially in 
Africa (Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006). The DHS does not include income or expenditure data; 
instead, the surveys collect information on household characteristics and household assets. 
Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001), I used principal components analysis (PCA) to construct 
wealth indices for each survey sample. Given the available measures, however, the resulting 
index was highly correlated with urban living. Among the African countries, the correlation 
between the wealth score and urban residence ranged from a low of .55 in Benin to a high of .86 
in Ethiopia. Because the wealth index is not a great measure, and because it is highly correlated 
with urban living, I ultimately dropped it from the multivariate analyses.  
Religious leaders and organizations are a common source of cultural scripts, so I included 
a dichotomous variable to indicate whether a respondent identified as Muslim. Empirical 
evidence suggests there are substantial cultural differences between Muslim and non-Muslim 
societies on issues of gender equality (Norris and Inglehart 2002). I included this as a control 
rather than a variable of primary interest, however, because religious context varies substantially 
across the countries in this analysis and because it is beyond the scope of this article to examine 
the complex relationship between religion and cultural scripts about gender. 
A final set of control variables measure women’s status within marriage, which may also 
be associated with attitudes about intimate partner violence. Women who have never married 
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may be more independent and less tolerant of intimate partner violence than their married peers. 
In countries with data from all women, I coded women who have ever been married as 1 and 
those who have never married as 0.  
Women who are relatively dependent on their marital relationship for their livelihoods 
may be more tolerant of abuse than women with more power in their relationship. Previous 
research in low-income countries has found that women who marry at young ages and women 
who have fewer years of schooling than their husbands are more likely to justify intimate partner 
violence (Kishor and Subaiya 2008; Yount 2005; Yount and Li 2009). Women who marry young 
generally complete fewer years of school, have less say in choosing their spouse, and have less 
time to form a sense of self outside of their marital relationship. Women with lower levels of 
education than their husbands may have relatively lower bargaining power within their 
relationship, making them more dependent and more likely to justify intimate partner violence.10  
I treated women’s age at marriage as a categorical variable, dividing ever-married women 
into those who were first married at age 15 years or younger, those married between age 16 and 
age 19, and those married at age 20 or older. I tested several specifications for capturing 
educational gaps between wives and husbands. A variable with three categories—husband and 
wife have the same level of education, husband attended a higher level of education, wife 
attended a higher level of education—captured the most meaningful variation among 
respondents. A separate variable for husbands’ education was coded the same way as the 
respondent’s educational attainment variable.  
                                                
10 Researchers have also found mixed evidence of an association between spousal age differences and attitudes 
about intimate partner violence (e.g., Kishor and Subaiya 2008). In the data used here, there was only a weak 
association between spousal age gaps and attitudes about intimate partner violence. For the sake of parsimony, I 
dropped this variable from the analysis. 
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Unfortunately, direct measures of individual access to global cultural scripts, or the 
influence of those scripts, are not available in large national samples from many countries. 
Therefore, I cannot test the direct influence of world society on individual attitudes. As detailed 
in the previous section, however, I have the data to investigate whether world society theory may 
be applied to explain the observed trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence. The next 
section describes how I test each of the hypotheses described earlier.  
 
Analytic Plan 
Hypothesis 1. The first part of the analysis describes the trends in attitudes about intimate partner 
violence. To examine Hypothesis 1, I used adjusted Wald tests to analyze whether there was a 
statistically significant change between the first and second waves in the proportion of 
respondents in each country who reject intimate partner violence.  
Hypothesis 2. To test Hypothesis 2, I examined predictors of rejection of intimate partner 
violence. I used chi-square tests to examine the bivariate relationship between each predictor 
variable and rejection of intimate partner violence (results available from author). I then tested 
the multivariate relationship between the predictor variables and rejection of intimate partner 
violence using logistic regression.  
Hypothesis 3. The next part of the analysis examines the extent to which aggregate-level 
trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence are explained by shifts in population 
composition. I used direct standardization to examine how much of the change over time was 
due to increases in urban living, educational attainment, and media access. Direct standardization 
allows for estimation of a counterfactual scenario: What percent of the population in wave 2 
would have rejected intimate partner violence if attitudes about intimate partner violence had 
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remained unchanged but the population composition had shifted? For each survey wave in each 
country, I divided the population into subgroups by urban/rural residence, highest level of 
education attended, and media access/no access. This resulted in a distribution of respondents 
across 16 subgroups. For each subgroup, I estimated the percent who rejected intimate partner 
violence (rate of rejection). Standardization showed whether the percent who reject intimate 
partner violence in the population would have changed if the rate of rejection for each subgroup 
had remained the same. So, for each country, I multiplied the subgroup distribution from wave 2 
by the rates of rejection from wave 1. 
Hypothesis 4. The final part of the analysis tests how much of the change in population 
averages on the dependent variable can be explained by within-cohort change and how much can 
be explained by cohort replacement. To do this, I used linear regression decomposition 
(Firebaugh 1989). This model estimates change due to cohort replacement net of within-cohort 
change (the combined effects of age and period) and vice versa. For each country, I pooled the 
two waves of data and regressed my outcome variable on survey year and respondent’s birth 
year: 
 
y = b0 + b1 survey year + b2 birth year + e 
 
The slopes from this regression equation represent the expected change in the percent of 
respondents who reject intimate partner violence (y) for every one-year increase in survey year 
or mean birth year. For each country, I multiplied the slopes from the regression by the actual 
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change in survey year and mean birth year.11 The elapsed time between survey years and the 
difference in mean birth year was approximately five years for each country. This produced 
estimates of the within-cohort and cohort replacement components of the change in the percent 
who reject intimate partner violence: 
 
Within-cohort change = b1 (wave 2 survey year – wave 1 survey year) 
Cohort replacement = b2 (mean birth year in wave 2 – mean birth year in wave 1) 
This method assumes that the two components are orthogonal and that the effects are linear. I 
examined the reasonableness of these assumptions by testing how closely the predicted change 




The data show striking changes in the proportion of women in each country who reject intimate 
partner violence. The changes are impressive because of the nearly uniform direction of the trend 
and their magnitude within a span of only five years. Figure 2.3 shows the proportion of women 
who reject all justifications for intimate partner violence in each survey wave for each country: 
the top bar is the percent in wave 1 and the middle bar is the percent in wave 2. (The 
standardized wave 2 bar will be discussed below.) The change is statistically significant at α = 
.05 in all countries. In 23 out of 26 countries, there is a significant increase in the proportion of 
women rejecting intimate partner violence. Twelve of the countries saw more than a 10- 
                                                
11 I also conducted this analysis by estimating the marginal effects from a logistic regression and using the marginal 
effects in place of the coefficients from OLS regression. Results were the same, so I opted to include the OLS 
regression methodology and results for ease of interpretation. 
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percentage point increase in the rate of rejection. Nigeria had the largest change, with a 19-
percentage point increase in the proportion of women who reject intimate partner violence, 
followed by Zambia, Kenya, Rwanda, and Armenia with approximately 15-percentage point 
increases in the rejection of intimate partner violence.  
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Figure 2.3: Percent who Reject All Justifications for  
Intimate Partner Violence 
Wave 1 Actual Wave 2 Actual Wave 2 Standardized 
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India, Bolivia, and Ethiopia had the smallest increases in rates of rejection, but the 
changes are all still statistically significant and in the expected direction. Indonesia, Jordan, and 
Madagascar are clear outliers. Those three countries had a statistically significant decrease in the 
proportion of women who reject intimate partner violence.  
When examining responses by survey year for each scenario incorporated into the 
outcome measure, the detailed story is largely the same as the picture in Figure 2.3. Twenty 
countries had significant decreases in the acceptability of at least three of the scenarios as 
justification for intimate partner violence. In Turkey, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, the trend appears 
to be more tenuous. The trend is in the opposite direction for three or four of the scenarios in 
Indonesia, Jordan, and Madagascar.  
Additional tests examined whether trends were similar among women who had married 
and those who had not, as well as among men. In all countries where both ever- and never-
married women were surveyed, the observed trend was in the same direction and of similar 
magnitude regardless of marital status (results not shown). I used two waves of data available for 
men’s attitudes about intimate partner violence for 15 of the countries included in this study. 
Trends among men mirror those among women. Twelve countries had significant and substantial 
increases in the percent of men rejecting intimate partner violence. In the Dominican Republic, 
there was no significant change in the percent of men rejecting intimate partner violence. In 
Indonesia and Madagascar, as among women, there was a significant decrease in the percent of 
men rejecting intimate partner violence.  
Overall, I find a great deal of support for Hypothesis 1. With the exception of Indonesia, 
Jordan, and Madagascar, women were substantially more likely to reject intimate partner 
violence in the more recent wave of data collection. These substantial changes occurred over a 
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span of only five years, and the observed change was comparable among women who have ever 
married and those who have not, as well as among men. The trend in attitudes about intimate 
partner violence is converging toward the global cultural script that prescribes the rejection of 
violence against women. 
 
Mechanisms of Diffusion: Predictors of Attitudes about Intimate Partner Violence 
Next, I examine whether people with greater access to global cultural scripts are more likely to 
endorse the values embedded in those scripts. I tested three primary mechanisms linking 
individuals to global cultural scripts as predictors of women’s attitudes about intimate partner 
violence: urban residence, education, and media access. Tables 2.2a and 2.2b present results of 
multivariate logistic regression as odds ratios. These models tested the significance of the three 
mechanisms of diffusion simultaneously, while controlling for survey wave, Muslim identity, 
age, age-squared, marital status, age at marriage, and husband’s education. The first coefficient 
in the top left of the first table means that in Armenia, women in wave 2 had 1.99 greater odds of 
rejecting intimate partner violence than did women in wave 1, controlling for the other factors in 
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Results presented in Tables 2.2a and 2.2b are again remarkable for their consistency. In 
22 countries, women who lived in urban areas had higher odds of rejecting intimate partner 
violence, controlling for all other factors. The association is not significant in Mali and Zambia 
and it goes in the opposite direction in Madagascar and Nepal. Women who had attended at least 
some secondary school had much higher odds of rejecting intimate partner violence in all but 
four countries. The effect of higher education is even larger and is significant in each country. 
Even controlling for urban living and education, media access is still associated with higher odds 
of rejecting intimate partner violence in 14 countries. Overall, each of these mechanisms for 
diffusion of global norms has a substantial, independent effect on the odds of rejecting intimate 
partner violence. This is strong support for Hypothesis 2: women with more access to global 
discourse are more likely to reject intimate partner violence. 
It is also worth noting effects for some of the other variables in the final models. 
Controlling for all other factors in the model, older women were more likely to reject intimate 
partner violence in 17 of the countries. In many of these countries the effect is curvilinear; the 
age-squared term is significant, indicating that the youngest and oldest respondents were least 
likely to reject intimate partner violence. I will discuss the effect of age further during the 
examination of cohort replacement versus intra-cohort change.  
In 14 of the 20 countries that did not restrict the sample based on marital status, women 
who had never married were more likely than those who had married to reject intimate partner 
violence. Moreover, in 12 countries, women who married at older ages were more likely than 
women who married at age 15 or younger to reject intimate partner violence. This indicates that 
women’s status in marriage is associated with attitudes about intimate partner violence, even 
after controlling for key demographic characteristics.  
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In the final model, I eliminated the categorical variable capturing spousal differences in 
education and replaced it with a categorical measure of husband’s educational attainment. 
Models that include variables for spousal educational differences indicate that, contrary to 
expectation, compared to women in couples with the same educational level, women in 
marriages with husbands who had more education were more likely to reject intimate partner 
violence, and women in marriages where they had more education than their husbands were less 
likely to reject intimate partner violence. Models that include husband’s educational attainment 
reveal that the positive relationship between education and attitudes about intimate partner 
violence for both women and men is stronger than the effects of relative spousal education. In 
nearly all countries, a husband’s educational attainment had a positive association with his wife’s 
attitudes about intimate partner violence, independent of her own educational attainment.  
 
Explanations for the Aggregate Trend 
Increasing urban living, education, and media access. Because urban residence, education, and 
media access are strongly associated with attitudes about intimate partner violence at the 
individual level, it is important to examine how much of the aggregate-level trend is explained 
by changes in the population composition on these characteristics. A first indication of the role of 
population compositional changes is found in Tables 2.2a and 2.2b. The coefficient on wave 2 
remains statistically significant in every country except for India and Turkey, despite inclusion of 
a number of demographic predictors. This is evidence that urbanization, increasing educational 
attainment, expanding media access, and improvements in women’s status in marriage do not 
explain all of the change in attitudes about intimate partner violence.  
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I further tested the magnitude of the effect of compositional changes by estimating a 
counterfactual: the percent of women who would have rejected all justifications for violence in 
wave 2 if rates of rejection of intimate partner violence had remained the same as they were for 
each population group in wave 1. As described earlier, I defined population groups by 
urban/rural residence, level of education, and media access because these characteristics are 
consistently associated with attitudes about intimate partner violence. In Figure 2.3, the first and 
second bars show the actual percent of women who rejected intimate partner violence in waves 1 
and 2. The third bar for each country shows what the rejection percentage would have been in 
wave 2 if the population composition had changed but the rates of rejection within each 
population group had remained the same.  
In almost all countries, the counterfactual scenario produces a rejection percentage that is 
remarkably close to the actual wave 1 percent who rejected intimate partner violence. The wave 
2 standardized bar looks like the wave 1 bar. This means that had there not been within-group 
attitudinal changes, there would have been little change between waves in the percent who reject 
intimate partner violence. In most countries, population compositional changes account for only 
a small portion of the observed change between waves 1 and 2. Turkey is the exception, where 
population compositional changes account for two-thirds of the change in attitudes. Otherwise, 
population compositional changes account for one-third of the change in Ethiopia and India, one-
quarter of the change in Armenia and Tanzania, and 20 percent or less of the change in all other 
countries. This provides support for Hypothesis 3: increasing urbanization, educational 
attainment, and media access explain some, but only a small portion, of the change in the percent 
of women who reject intimate partner violence. This finding is consistent with widespread 
diffusion of global cultural scripts through a variety of mechanisms. 
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Within-cohort change and cohort replacement. The analysis of within-cohort change 
versus cohort replacement examines how much of the observed change is due to changes within 
the birth cohorts represented in both waves of data collection versus change due to entrance into 
the population of new cohorts of women with different attitudes than their predecessors. As 
hypothesized, within-cohort change has greater explanatory power than does cohort replacement: 
increases within birth cohorts in the percent rejecting intimate partner violence explain the 
population-level trends in attitudes. In a surprising finding, however, in most countries, cohort 
replacement has a negative effect on the percent of women who rejected intimate partner 
violence. 
Table 2.3 presents results of the regression decomposition. The left panel (columns 1 and 
2) presents results already displayed in Figure 2.3: the percent of women in each survey who 
reject intimate partner violence. The third column shows the percentage-point change between 
the two time points, or the percent in wave 2 minus the percent in wave 1. Columns 4 and 5 show 
results from the regression decomposition analysis described earlier. Column 4 presents the 
amount (in percentage-points) of predicted change due to cohort replacement, and column 5 
shows the amount of predicted change due to within-cohort change.  
If this linear regression model fits the data, the predicted change in columns 4 and 5 
should sum to equal the observed change shown in column 3. The model fits in cases where both 
survey year and a respondent’s birth cohort have independent linear effects on the likelihood of 
rejection of intimate partner violence. The percentages in column 6 indicate how closely the 
predicted change mirrors the actual change. Agreement is close to 100 percent in almost all 
countries, indicating that this is an appropriate method for decomposing within-cohort change 
 45 
versus cohort replacement. In India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Nepal, and Zimbabwe, the 
agreement is not as strong, so the decomposition results should be interpreted with caution.12 
 
 
Finally, columns 7 and 8 show that within-cohort change is overwhelmingly driving the 
dominant trend at the aggregate level. Column 7 shows the percent of the observed change 
                                                
12 In these five countries, the effect of survey wave (the contribution of within-cohort change) depends on the 
respondent’s birth cohort. Effects of survey year and birth year are not independent so linear regression 
decomposition cannot isolate their contributions to the change. Nonetheless, the overall picture gleaned from the 
decomposition is consistent with a closer examination of the data: in Indonesia and Madagascar, cohort replacement 
made a substantial contribution to the decrease in the percent of women who reject intimate partner violence; in 
India, Nepal, and Zimbabwe, cohort replacement accounted for none of the increase in the percent of women who 
reject intimate partner violence. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Armenia 69.29 83.58 14.29 -0.90 15.48 102% -6% 108%
Benin 38.41 51.41 13.00 0.42 12.59 100% 3% 97%
Bolivia 77.83 80.96 3.13 0.12 2.73 91% 4% 87%
Cambodia 39.93 52.15 12.22 0.66 12.95 111% 5% 106%
Dominican Rep. 90.67 95.54 4.87 -0.39 4.89 92% -8% 100%
Egypt 49.02 60.06 11.04 0.13 10.64 98% 1% 96%
Ethiopia 13.92 17.84 3.92 0.81 3.24 103% 21% 83%
Ghana 50.50 61.52 11.02 -1.52 12.77 102% -14% 116%
Haiti 56.52 67.33 10.81 -1.82 13.43 107% -17% 124%
India 42.82 44.42 1.60 -0.55 2.40 116% -34% 150%
Indonesia 72.28 67.30 -4.98 -1.95 -2.24 84% 39% 45%
Jordan 28.91 25.79 -3.12 -0.70 -2.40 99% 22% 77%
Kenya 29.33 45.32 15.99 -0.79 16.51 98% -5% 103%
Madagascar 69.96 65.70 -4.26 -1.63 -0.55 51% 38% 13%
Malawi 62.26 69.23 6.97 -2.09 9.32 104% -30% 134%
Mali 9.30 22.05 12.75 -0.06 13.75 107% 0% 108%
Nepal 71.05 76.50 5.45 -0.65 7.14 119% -12% 131%
Nigeria 33.13 52.33 19.20 -0.72 20.83 105% -4% 108%
Philippines 73.21 83.43 10.22 -0.47 10.92 102% -5% 107%
Rwanda 33.22 47.99 14.77 -0.87 14.58 93% -6% 99%
Senegal 32.96 39.21 6.25 -0.38 5.95 89% -6% 95%
Tanzania 38.71 44.38 5.67 -1.13 6.36 92% -20% 112%
Turkey 50.36 55.06 4.70 0.03 4.16 89% 1% 89%
Uganda 22.09 27.82 5.73 -1.09 7.00 103% -19% 122%
Zambia 21.83 38.26 16.43 -1.65 18.56 103% -10% 113%
Zimbabwe 46.30 50.87 4.57 -2.73 7.94 114% -60% 174%
% Agreement:
 Predicted / 
Observed: 
(4) + (5) / (3)
% Due to Cohort 
Replacement:
(4) / (3)
% Due to Within-
Cohort Change:
(5) / (3)
Note: Negative percents indicate that if there had only been cohort replacement and no within cohort change, the trend in attitudes about intimate partner 
violence would be moving in the opposite direction. 
Table 2.3: Cohort Replacement vs. Within-Cohort Change
Percent who Reject 
Intimate Partner Violence Regression Decomposition









attributable to cohort replacement and column 8 presents the percent attributable to within-cohort 
change. In outlier countries that had a decrease in rejection of intimate partner violence, cohort 
replacement explains a substantial portion of the aggregate trend. In Indonesia and Madagascar, 
nearly 40 percent of the change can be attributed to cohort replacement. Similarly, in Jordan, 
over 20 percent of the decrease in the percent of women who reject intimate partner violence was 
due to cohort replacement. As seen earlier, in all other countries, women were more likely to 
reject intimate partner violence in wave 2 than in wave 1. Of those countries, cohort replacement 
contributed the most to the attitudinal trend in Ethiopia: 21 percent of the change was due to 
cohort replacement.  
In the other 22 countries, cohort replacement explains almost none of the change. The 
percent of change due to cohort replacement is negative for many of these countries: had there 
been only cohort replacement and no within-cohort change, the trend would go in the opposite 
direction. If cohort replacement was the only factor driving the change, a smaller percentage of 
women in wave 2 than in wave 1 would have rejected intimate partner violence. Column 8 shows 
that within-cohort change in these countries accounts for more than 100 percent of the observed 
change. Based on these results, I find support for only part of Hypothesis 4. Within-cohort 
change is the driving factor behind the increase in the percent of women who reject intimate 
partner violence. Contrary to expectations, however, in most countries cohort replacement does 
not explain any of the observed trend. 
This finding relates to the somewhat surprising relationship between age and rejection of 
intimate partner violence. Cohort replacement explains none of the observed trend in most 
countries because young women were less likely than older women to reject intimate partner 
violence. The logistic regression models presented in Tables 2.2a and 2.2b show that odds of 
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rejecting intimate partner violence generally increase with age. Although this does not conform 
to expectations that youth are more likely to adapt to new social norms, it is consistent with the 
idea that age is a source of empowerment for women. Women generally gain self-confidence, 
respect, and freedom as they age. This may translate into increased rejection of intimate partner 
violence.  
Within-cohort change may be due to respondent aging or a period effect that makes 
respondents of all ages in wave 2 more likely to reject intimate partner violence than respondents 
in wave 1. I posit that the period effect attributable to dissemination of global cultural scripts 
plays a major role. Evidence for this interpretation is provided by the fact that women of all ages 
were more likely to reject intimate partner violence in wave 2. In a separate analysis (not shown), 
I found that in most countries, a majority of cohorts showed a significant increase in the percent 
who rejected intimate partner violence. The trend is consistent across ages. In summary, within-
cohort change is overwhelmingly driving the dominant trend at the aggregate level. Cohort 
replacement explains some of the negative change in Indonesia, Jordan, and Madagascar, but 
otherwise it is not a good explanation. 
 
Discussion 
This study extends world society theory by testing whether it can be usefully applied to 
understanding trends in attitudes among nonelite individuals. Previous world society research 
documents the power of global cultural scripts and models to influence national policymakers. 
Scholars have found that the common pressures of world society explain otherwise inexplicable 
isomorphism in national policies (Meyer et al. 1997).  
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Global cultural scripts are not just relevant to national policymakers; they also provide 
moralized individual behavioral scripts that can influence individuals outside the halls of 
government. To capture the extent of world society’s influence, it is therefore important to study 
individual attitudes and behaviors. I examined trends in individual attitudes and found substantial 
support for the hypothesized influence of global cultural scripts.  
The study examined data on individual attitudes about intimate partner violence during a 
period of heighted transnational activism on this issue. Results show that after only five years, a 
significantly larger percentage of women in Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Cambodia, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, India, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe rejected 
intimate partner violence. An increase in the rejection of intimate partner violence was evident in 
23 of the 26 countries studied and the size of the change was robust in 12 of those countries. For 
example, in Nigeria, the percent of women who rejected intimate partner violence increased from 
33 percent in 2003 to 52 percent in 2008. Nearly a 20-percentage point change within only five 
years is evidence of a very rapid shift in attitudes. This trend is the same among ever- and never-
married women. In countries for which data are available, men’s attitudinal trends follow the 
same patterns.  
The increase in rejection of intimate partner violence occurred during the first decade of 
the 2000s, which corresponds with increasing global attention to issues of violence against 
women (Merry 2006). During this time period, world society agents sought to reach individuals 
directly through activities such as development programming and media outreach. Transnational 
advocates also pressured national governments for relevant policy action. Such pressure led to a 
dramatic increase in the number of countries that passed legislation addressing forms of violence 
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against women. At the same time, national political debates likely contributed to the spread of 
global cultural scripts.  
The near uniformity of the observed trend and the speed of change in attitudes about 
intimate partner violence suggest something occurred in the past decade that affected women 
(and men) globally. Absent a macro-level influence, there is no reason to expect such 
extraordinary consistency in attitudinal trends. I posit that diffusion of global cultural scripts 
about women’s rights, gender equality, and the ills of violence against women was an important 
macro-level factor that influenced national policymakers and people at the grassroots.  
Further analysis shows that the demographic processes underlying the attitudinal trends 
are consistent with the proposed theoretical framework that links world society with nonelite 
individuals through broad diffusion of global cultural scripts. The changes in attitudes about 
intimate partner violence occurred too rapidly to be explained by structural socioeconomic or 
demographic shifts, both of which are expected to occur over the course of generations. Neither 
shifts in population composition in terms of urban living, educational attainment, and access to 
media nor cohort replacement explain much of the observed increase in rejection of intimate 
partner violence.  
In the cross-sectional analysis, I found that women with greater access to global cultural 
scripts through urban living, education, or access to media were more likely to reject intimate 
partner violence. Between the two survey waves, some countries experienced an increase in 
these key demographic indicators. These population compositional changes account for some of 
the increase in the rejection of intimate partner violence, but they explain only a small portion of 
the total change. In the cross-section, attitudes about intimate partner violence were also 
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associated with women’s status within marriage. However, changes in marital gender relations 
fail to explain the majority of the shift in attitudes about intimate partner violence.  
The aggregate-level trend is produced by an increase across socioeconomic groups in the 
likelihood of rejecting intimate partner violence. This is consistent with the diffusion of global 
cultural scripts through a wide variety of mechanisms. Cultural scripts are spread not only 
through narrow channels of cultural diffusion, such as education, but also through mechanisms 
such as development programming, NGO outreach, and interpersonal networks. That women in a 
variety of socioeconomic positions have all become more likely to reject intimate partner 
violence suggests a general cultural shift.  
Further evidence of a general cultural shift is provided by the analysis of within-cohort 
change versus cohort replacement. Results show that within-cohort change explains nearly all of 
the observed change. Between survey waves, women of all ages became more likely to reject 
intimate partner violence. This finding, like the finding that population compositional changes do 
not explain a majority of the attitudinal trend, is also consistent with the wide dissemination and 
influence of global cultural scripts. The results provide evidence of rapid cultural diffusion, not 
slow demographic change.  
The cohort replacement analysis also led to the surprising finding that younger women 
were less likely than their elders to reject intimate partner violence. The popular image of social 
change—inspired by young people coming to adulthood with liberal attitudes—does not apply in 
this case. In most countries included in this study, the youngest respondents were among the 
least likely to reject intimate partner violence. Although it may result from the positive 
relationship between age and women’s empowerment (as discussed by Kishor and Subaiya 
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[2008]), this finding suggests that the relationship between age and intimate partner violence 
attitudes deserves further research.  
This study inspires several other avenues for future research. First, although I examined 
whether trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence are converging toward global cultural 
scripts, I did not directly test the influence of global discourse. An important next step is the 
collection of individual-level data on access to global cultural scripts to directly test the influence 
of world society.  
Second, the focus of this study was on time trends in attitudes about intimate partner 
violence. Data were comparable across time within country but could not be compared across 
countries. Further research is needed to investigate cross-national differences in levels of 
acceptance of intimate partner violence. Analyses examining differences in the speed of change 
in attitudes about intimate partner violence will also contribute to our understanding of the 
effects of global cultural diffusion.  
Third, future research should expand temporal and geographic coverage. The DHS 
continues to collect data and recently released a third wave of data on attitudes about intimate 
partner violence from five countries. The trend of increasing rejection of intimate partner 
violence accelerated in Ethiopia, Malawi, Nepal, and Zimbabwe. Rwanda saw a slight reversal of 
the trend. As more data become available, additional analyses should test the longevity of the 
current trend in attitudes about intimate partner violence. In addition, more data is needed to 
study the relationship between attitudinal trends in low-, middle-, and high-income countries. 
Detailed studies of outlier countries should examine why there is increasing acceptance of 
intimate partner violence in Indonesia, Jordan, and Madagascar. Data used in this study provide 
few clues as to why attitudinal shifts in those countries did not follow the dominant trend.  
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Finally, it is important to note that the outcome investigated here was reported attitudes 
about intimate partner violence. With these data, there is no way to distinguish real attitudinal 
change from increasing influence of social desirability. For this study, I argue that the distinction 
is unimportant; respondents’ knowledge of the socially desirable response is in itself evidence of 
the diffusion of global norms. It does matter, however, whether women actually believe it is okay 
for husbands to beat their wives.  
Moreover, studies of the influence of world society on national policies highlight 
decoupling between form and function resulting from adoption of policy models regardless of 
how well they fit a nation-state’s needs and intentions (Meyer et al. 1997). The same pattern of 
decoupling is possible within individuals. Decoupling may manifest as a disconnect between 
stated attitudes and actions. Individuals will adopt or adapt some aspects of the global cultural 
discourse and reject others. Similarly, individuals may selectively apply the logic of the global 
cultural discourse. Still, as Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) found, conformity with world 
society that begins as an “empty promise” may have long-term consequences by providing 
language used to promote social change. Additional in-depth research on how individuals make 
use of global cultural scripts about violence against women will help to advance the findings of 
this study. 
Investigation of connections between global cultural scripts and individual attitudes is an 
important extension of world society research. Global cultural models matter not only because 
they influence elites worldwide but also because of their potential to influence millions of 
individuals in less privileged social locations. During the first decade of the 2000s, as violence 
against women became an increasingly prominent issue worldwide, women across the globe 
became more likely to reject intimate partner violence. Results are consistent with the influence 
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of cultural diffusion, not structural socioeconomic or demographic changes. Previous case study 
research has documented specific instances of the effect of the global on the local. This study 
found evidence that the diffusion of global cultural scripts can produce widespread trends in 
attitudes at the individual level. 
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Chapter 3 
Men’s Gender Attitudes and HIV Risk 
 
Introduction 
Efforts to combat the spread of HIV are strengthened by knowledge of the motivations for 
behaviors that put people at risk of contracting the virus. In sub-Saharan Africa, HIV is primarily 
transmitted through heterosexual sex (Gouws and Cuchi 2012). Understanding relations between 
men and women, therefore, is important for understanding HIV transmission. This study 
examines associations between HIV risk and gender attitudes—ideals about how men and 
women should relate. I test the hypotheses that a man’s attitudes about gender are related to his 
sexual behaviors and his self-assessed risk of HIV. Analyses of both quantitative and qualitative 
data extend findings from other studies that demonstrate associations between rigid adherence to 
unequal gender attitudes and negative health outcomes among men (Barker et al. 2010).  
This study builds on existing work in several ways. It is one of the first academic studies 
to examine the association between gender attitudes and HIV risk, making use of measurement 
tools created by public health practitioners. The study includes a survey incorporating a modified 
version of the Gender Equitable Men (GEM) scale (Pulerwitz and Barker 2008), which captured 
gender attitudes among young men in urban Malawi. Quantitative analyses test for associations 
between those attitudes and recent sexual health behaviors related to HIV risk. At the same time, 
qualitative data from the study population is used to enhance interpretation of the quantitative 
 55 
results. This is the first study of this kind in Malawi, an important location for HIV prevention 
research because of the relatively high HIV prevalence rate. Also, expanding the geographic 
scope of this type of research is valuable because constructions of gender are context specific.  
Finally, the data permit a novel analysis of the association between an individual’s gender 
attitudes and his self-assessed HIV risk. Self-assessed risk matters because perceptions of risk 
are correlated with adoption of risk reduction strategies (Kohler, Behrman, and Watkins 2007). 
The findings suggest that self-assessed risk may be a function of both behaviors and masculine 
self-image. They indicate that this area of research is worthy of further examination. Overall, this 
study adds to our understanding of underlying motivations for men’s sexual health behaviors and 
contributes to the literature on the role of gender systems in reproductive health. 
 
Gender Attitudes and HIV Risk 
An individual’s gender attitudes encompass both ideals about how men and women should 
behave and how they should relate. In other words, ideals of masculinity and femininity, as well 
as levels of desired egalitarianism, are part of gender attitudes. These facets of a person’s gender 
ideology are integrally related and both can influence his/her sexual behaviors and risk of HIV. 
For example, the degree to which a man believes that there should be equality or inequality in his 
intimate relationships will affect who he chooses as partners and how he interacts with them. 
Similarly, the extent to which sexual prowess is integral to a man’s successful demonstration of 
masculinity (to himself and to others) affects his sexual behavioral choices, including how much 
he is willing to put himself at risk of becoming infected with HIV. Individuals with unequal 
gender attitudes believe that men should dominate and control women, and often they will 
choose to enact a masculinity ideal that is based on their understanding of male superiority in 
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intimate relationships (Jewkes and Morrell 2010). Recent studies have begun to explore these 
connections. 
A large body of literature documents the influence of gender systems on reproductive 
health (Blanc 2001; Mason 2001; Varga 2003; Li 2004; Dodoo and Frost 2008). Much of this 
literature focuses on the association between women’s relative disadvantage, or lack of 
autonomy, and negative health outcomes (Dyson and Moore 1983; Greene and Biddlecom 2000; 
Beegle et al. 2001; Furuta and Salway 2006; Allendorf 2007). In addition to gender inequality, 
researchers are increasingly recognizing that social norms prescribing the types of actions and 
interactions that are considered masculine or feminine also influence sexual and health behaviors 
(Campbell 1997; Courtenay 2000; Silberschmidt 2001; Agadjanian 2002; Williams 2003; Barker 
and Ricardo 2005; Barker et al. 2010; Jewkes and Morrell 2010; Wyrod 2011; Odimegwu, 
Pallikadavath, and Adedeni 2012). Many behaviors that are commonly associated with the 
demonstration of masculinity—such as disregard for risk, rejection of help seeking, 
subordination of women, and violence—can produce negative health outcomes for men and their 
partners. For example, sexual practices that are socially rewarded as proof of masculinity in 
many contexts, including having multiple sexual partners, foregoing protection from STIs, 
paying for sex, and engaging in forced sex, are also associated with the spread of HIV (Rivers 
and Aggleton 1999; Mane and Aggleton 2001; Kaler 2003; Hunter 2005; Walker 2005; Nyanzi, 
Nyanzi-Wakholi, and Kalina 2009; Macia, Maharaj, and Gresh 2011; Dworkin et al. 2012). Most 
prior studies of these associations have used qualitative research methods to identify how local 
conceptions of masculinity relate to sexual health. Quantitative studies are also needed to test 
whether these associations are evident in larger populations.  
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Thus far, only a few policy reports have documented quantitative evidence of statistical 
associations between men’s gender attitudes and sexual health behaviors (Barker et al. 2010). 
Much of this research has made use of the Gender Equitable Men (GEM) scale, which was 
constructed for measuring men’s gender attitudes (Pulerwitz and Barker 2008). The scale was 
originally developed and tested in Brazil, and has since been tested in Tanzania, Ghana, Chile, 
Croatia, India, Mexico, and Rwanda (Barker et al. 2011; FHI 360 2012). Policy reports from 
those studies indicated that men with relatively equitable gender attitudes were less likely to 
report perpetration of intimate partner violence, more likely to report contraceptive use, more 
likely to have been tested for HIV, and more likely to have accompanied their partner to a 
prenatal healthcare visit. Men with relatively less equitable gender attitudes had more sex 
partners in the 12 months preceding the surveys, and were more likely to have concurrent sexual 
partners, less likely to use condoms, more likely to have paid for sex, and more likely to have 
perpetrated intimate partner violence (Barker et al. 2011; FHI 360 2012). In sum, these studies 
show correlations between inequitable gender attitudes and negative sexual and reproductive 
health behaviors and outcomes.  
Little research on this topic has been conducted in Malawi. Only a few qualitative studies 
have examined the relevance of gender attitudes and contemporary constructions of masculinity 
for sexual health. In a study of rural Malawians, Kaler (2003) shows that some sexual behaviors 
labeled “risky” by public health officials are also interpreted as markers of masculinity. She finds 
that men claim to be HIV-positive as a rhetorical demonstration of their masculine behaviors, 
such as travel (which is associated with labor market success) and having sex with many women. 
Similarly, Izugbara and Undie (2008) find that young men in Malawi rely on accounts of sexual 
exploits to achieve validation and respect from peers. These studies demonstrate that sexual 
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behaviors are a common social domain for the performance of masculinity. They contribute to 
the expectation that Malawian men with inequitable gender attitudes will use sexual behaviors to 
demonstrate their masculinity through their domination of women, which can have implications 
for their sexual health and the health of their partners. 
In this study, I examine the relationship between gender attitudes and three outcomes that 
are linked to the risk of HIV infection: number of sexual partners, experience of symptoms of a 
sexually transmitted infection (STI), and HIV testing. Having multiple sexual partners, especially 
if they are concurrent relationships, is a major risk factor for HIV infection (Mah and Halperin 
2010). The second dependent variable—experience of STI symptoms in the month preceding the 
survey—is a behavioral outcome rather than a behavior itself. The underlying behavior of 
interest is condom use when there is a chance of infection. The survey asked about condom use, 
but did not collect details on marital status or partner selection in order to encourage truthful 
reporting of sexual behaviors. The condom use measures were difficult to interpret without 
information on the relationship context. Therefore, since STI symptoms are an indicator that a 
man has exposed himself to the risk of HIV infection by having unprotected sex, I opted to use 
this behavioral outcome measure instead of a measure of the behavior itself. The third dependent 
variable measures whether the respondent has ever been tested for HIV. HIV testing is promoted 
as a method of reducing transmission because when HIV-positive individuals receive treatment 
they reduce their viral load and their chances of infecting others (Cohen et al. 2011). Also, when 
individuals learn that both they and their partners are HIV negative, they may take steps to 
protect themselves from future infection (Delavande and Kohler 2012). Throughout the paper, 
for the sake of brevity, I refer to the three outcomes as sexual health behaviors, even though one 
of the measures captures a behavioral outcome. 
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I expect gender attitudes to be associated with each of the three sexual health behaviors. 
First, I anticipate that men with relatively more equitable gender attitudes will have fewer sexual 
partners. Men who believe in male dominance in decision-making in intimate relationships and 
who believe that “real men” have lots of sex are likely to aspire to having multiple sexual 
partners as proof of their masculinity (Hunter 2005; Simpson 2007; Macia et al. 2011). Second, I 
hypothesize that men with more equitable gender attitudes will be less likely to experience 
symptoms of an STI. In Malawi, sex without condoms is viewed as both more pleasurable and 
more masculine (Kaler 2003; Watkins 2004), which may lead men to forgo protection from STIs 
as proof of their manliness. Moreover, men who use their sexual experiences as proof of 
masculinity may be hesitant to prioritize protection from STIs over opportunities for sex. Finally, 
I expect that men with more equitable gender attitudes will be more likely to have undergone 
HIV testing. Men cultivating a masculine image of invincibility and sexual prowess may avoid 
testing for HIV as a potential sign of weakness or as an indication that they prioritize health 
concerns over sexual experiences (Barker et al. 2011). Also, given their understanding of the 
transmissibility of HIV, men who use accounts of their sexual exploits to validate their 
masculinity are often ambivalent about testing because they assume that a test will indicate that 
they are HIV positive (Kaler 2003; Kaler 2004; Kaler and Watkins 2010). Each of these 
hypothesized associations is tested in the analyses. 
In addition to studying links between gender attitudes and sexual health behaviors, I also 
examine the associations between gender attitudes and self-assessed risk of current and future 
HIV infection. Perceptions of individual and community-level risk of HIV are thought to be 
important determinants of sexual behavior and, therefore, have implications for the spread of 
HIV (Smith 2003; Smith and Watkins 2005). Previous studies of self-assessed risk have 
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demonstrated that demographic characteristics, sexual behavior, perceptions of partners’ sexual 
behavior, and perceived community prevalence of HIV are associated with self-assessed HIV 
risk (Anglewicz and Kohler 2009). I hypothesize that gender attitudes will also be associated 
with self-assessed risk. Drawing on qualitative work from rural Malawi (Kaler 2003), I expect 
respondents who adhere to inequitable gender norms to be more likely to report that they are at 
medium to high risk of HIV for two reasons. First, as examined in the first part of the analysis, 
the frequency of HIV-risk behaviors, such as having multiple partners, is expected to mediate an 
association between gender attitudes and self-assessed risk (Do and Meekers 2009). Second, men 
whose masculine identity is founded partially on sexual prowess may cultivate a self-image of 
high HIV risk, regardless of their actual sexual behaviors. If so, the association between gender 
attitudes and self-assessed risk will remain significant, even in statistical models that include 
controls for sexual behaviors. I examine the plausibility of each of these explanations.  
 
Setting 
This research was conducted among young men in the capital city of Malawi. Contemporary 
urban Malawi is characterized by social transition due to changing demographic and material 
conditions, global and local ideational influences, and the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS. 
Malawi’s estimated adult HIV prevalence rate of 11 percent is among the highest in the world 
(National Statistics Office [Malawi] and ICF Macro 2011). The prevalence rate is much higher in 
urban areas, such as the study site, averaging 17 percent of adults. Approximately half of adult 
men have ever been tested for HIV and the percent ever tested increases with education and 
wealth. 
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 Marriage is a highly valued institution in Malawi, yet divorce and remarriage are 
common (Kaler 2001), as are sexual relationships outside of marriage (Clark 2010). The median 
age of first marriage for urban men is approximately 24 years old, while the median age for first 
sexual intercourse is between 18 and 19 years old (National Statistics Office [Malawi] and ICF 
Macro 2011). This means that for many men, sex and marriage are not tightly linked. Stories of 
sexual exploits are an important resource for claiming respect, especially among young men 
(Izugbara and Undie 2008), and social desirability encourages young men to over-estimate their 
sexual experience (Kelly et al. 2013).  
This study took place in a low- and middle-income neighborhood that is accessible by 
public transportation from the main bus depot and the two main commercial centers of the city. 
The variety of house constructions provides visible evidence of the socioeconomic heterogeneity. 
Houses range from mud structures in disrepair with no privacy to buildings made of cement with 
corrugated iron roofs, brick fences, and iron gates. Most residents of the area rent their 
accommodations; relatively few well-off families own their homes. Livelihood insecurity is a 
daily reality for many urban residents. At the time of this data collection, Malawi was 
experiencing a period of economic instability resulting in fuel shortages and rising prices for 
basic goods.   
 
Data and Measures 
The data for this paper come from a stratified random sample of approximately 1,270 men in one 
area of Lilongwe, as well as in-depth interviews with a sub-sample of those men. The data were 
collected as part of a larger survey experiment investigating demand for adult male circumcision 
for HIV prevention. The research site and sampling strategy for both the quantitative and 
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qualitative data collection were designed to meet the needs of the larger project. In March 2010, 
participants in the circumcision study were sampled from the catchment area of the study’s 
partner clinic, which corresponded to 29 census enumeration areas as defined by the Malawi 
National Statistics Office. The enumeration areas were further sub-divided into blocks using 
natural landmarks such as roads, walking paths, and streams. Two blocks per enumeration area 
were selected for inclusion and a full census was conducted in each selected block. One 
uncircumcised man between the ages of 18 and 35 was randomly selected from each household. 
Upon receiving consent, selected men were administered a baseline survey questionnaire about 
circumcision. The baseline survey sample consisted of approximately 1,700 men. A little more 
than one year later, in June 2011, the research team attempted to re-contact all baseline survey 
respondents and achieved a response rate of about 77 percent.    
Questions about gender attitudes and sexual health practices were included in the follow-
up survey. The survey was conducted face-to-face in a private location by young male Malawian 
enumerators. Because only uncircumcised men were eligible for participation in the survey, 
Muslim men and men from ethnic groups that regularly practice circumcision as part of a rite of 
passage (primarily Yao men) are excluded from the sample. Otherwise, the sample is designed to 
be representative of the target neighborhood in Lilongwe. For all quantitative analyses, the 
sample has been restricted to those respondents with no item missing data. Approximately 150 
follow-up respondents were excluded because of missing data, resulting in an analytic sample of 




Data for the behavioral outcomes come from three survey questions. Respondents were asked 
how many different women they had sex with during the preceding year. The answers are 
continuous, starting at zero and ranging up to 30 partners in the past year. The question regarding 
STIs asked about specific symptoms: “Some men experience pain during urination, have an 
unusual discharge from the penis, or have sores in the genital area. During the past 4 weeks, 
have you had… Pain during urination? Unusual discharge? Sores in the genital area?” The 
three symptoms of an STI were combined into one variable coded 1 for respondents who had 
experienced any of the symptoms in the preceding month, and 0 otherwise. Finally, respondents 
were asked whether they had ever been tested for HIV and the answers were coded 1 for those 
who had been tested and 0 otherwise. 
The survey included two questions to capture subjective assessment of HIV risk. The first 
asked, “In your opinion, what is the likelihood (chance) that you are infected with HIV/AIDS 
now, no likelihood, low likelihood, medium likelihood, or high likelihood?” In the analyses, 
respondents who said that there was a medium or high likelihood that they are currently infected 
(coded 1) are compared with all other respondents (coded 0).13 The second question asked about 
future risk: “Now think about you yourself, do you think you are at higher, lower or equal risk 
than the average man of becoming infected with HIV/AIDS?” Again, the analyses compare men 
who said they were at higher risk than average (coded 1) with everyone else (coded 0).  
 
                                                
13 Responses were dichotomized in the same way by Anglewicz and Kohler (2009) who provide evidence that self-
perceived medium and high likelihood of infection is interpreted as higher than average risk. 
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GEM Scale Score 
The independent variable of interest was a modified GEM scale score. The GEM scale was 
initially developed and validated in Brazil and has since been tested in a number of countries 
(Pulerwitz and Barker 2008; Barker et al. 2011). Based on preliminary qualitative fieldwork, 13 
statements from the inequitable gender norms scale were selected for inclusion in the final 
section of the survey. Respondents were asked whether they agreed, partially agreed, or 
disagreed with each of the statements listed in Table 3.1. The percent of respondents who 
provided the gender equitable response is shown in the ‘disagree’ column of the table. This 
proportion varied by GEM scale item, ranging between 21 and 90 percent of respondents. 
 
 
Agree Partially Agree Disagree
I would feel weak if I asked for help 8.8% 1.3% 90.0%
You don't talk about sex, you just do it 19.0% 3.9% 77.2%
I would be outraged if my wife asked me to 
use a condom
24.0% 4.1% 71.9%
If a woman cheats on a man, it is ok for him to 
hit her
26.3% 3.8% 69.9%
There are times when a woman deserves to be 
beaten
41.0% 5.2% 53.8%
Men need sex more than women do 41.6% 9.9% 48.4%
It is a woman's responsibility to avoid getting 
pregnant when a pregnancy is not wanted
56.3% 4.9% 38.8%
Changing diapers, giving the kids a bath, and 
feeding the kids are a woman's responsibility
55.3% 6.6% 38.1%
Men are always ready to have sex 58.0% 5.1% 36.9%
A man should have the final word about 
decisions in his home
64.4% 6.5% 29.2%
It is the man who decides when to have sex 64.6% 10.2% 25.3%
Women need health services more than men 73.2% 5.2% 21.6%
A man needs other women, even if things are 
fine with his wife
73.5% 6.0% 20.5%
Notes: "Disagree" is the gender equitable response to each item.
Table 3.1: GEM Scale Components
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Responses to the scale items were summed into an additive scale that included one point 
for every ‘disagree’ response.14 Thus scale responses ranged from 0 to 13, with 13 representing 
the most equitable response pattern. The distribution of the summed GEM scale scores is 
presented in Figure 3.1. The internal reliability of the additive scale was tested using Cronbach’s 
alpha and produced a score of 0.71, which indicates an acceptable level of internal consistency. 
The scale has a mean of 6.2 and a standard deviation of 2.8, indicating a relatively wide range of 
gender attitudes centered around men with only moderately equitable attitudes. Barker et al. 
(2011) trichotomized the scale by score, categorizing men in the bottom third of the scale as low 
equity, middle third as medium equity, and top third as high equity. Using this same method, 
nearly 30 percent of the men in this sample are low equity, 49 percent are categorized as medium 
equity, and 21 percent are high equity. In comparison to the findings of other studies, the gender 
attitudes of men in Malawi are comparable to attitudes among men in Rwanda, generally more 
equitable than gender attitudes 
among men in India, and less 
equitable than gender attitudes 
among men in Latin American 
and East European countries 
(Barker et al. 2011). 
 
 An analysis of the demographic and socioeconomic predictors of GEM scale scores (not 
shown) indicated that education is the strongest predictor of gender attitudes. There is a weakly 
                                                
14 Factor analysis was also used to create a weighted scale score for each respondent. The correlation between the 
















Figure 3.1: Distribution of GEM Scale Scores 
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positive and curvilinear relationship between gender attitudes and age. And, individuals with 
greater expenditures generally have more egalitarian gender attitudes. These associations were 
no longer significant, however, when education was included in the models. Holding age and 
monthly expenditures constant, the average difference in GEM scale score between someone 
with no education and someone with more than secondary education was 4.5 points, a substantial 
difference on this 14-point scale. The strong association between gender attitudes and education 
was consistent with theories of gender, as well as the findings of previous studies (Pulerwitz and 
Barker 2008; Barker et al. 2011). Men with more education are more likely to have been exposed 
to a variety of forms of gender relations and are less likely to rely on explicit notions of gender 
inequality to assert their masculinity (Connell 1995). 
 
Control Variables 
Some of the models include controls for respondent age, education, and monthly expenditures. 
Age was treated as a continuous variable. The median age of first sex in this sample was 18 years 
old. I expected, therefore, a generally positive association between number of sex partners and 
age among those in their teens and twenties. The centrality of sexual prowess to the defense of a 
masculine identity is especially prominent among Malawian youth (Izugbara and Undie 2008) 
and may be less salient among older men. The association between number of sex partners and 
age, therefore, may reverse near the top of the sample age range. I anticipated the same to be true 
of symptoms of STIs. As the measure of HIV testing is ‘ever-tested’ for HIV, I expected a 
positive association with age because older men have had more sexually active years and more 
time to get an HIV test. Because sexual activity and HIV prevalence increases with age (until 
early 40s), I anticipated a positive association between age and self-assessed risk of HIV, at least 
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among the younger men in the sample. Both age and age-squared were included in the final 
models. 
Education was captured using a continuous measure of number of years of education 
completed. I expected a positive association between education and number of sex partners, 
mostly mediated by wealth. Educated men generally have more access to resources and wealth is 
associated with greater numbers of sex partners in Malawi (Swidler and Watkins 2007). Despite 
having greater numbers of sex partners, more educated men may be less likely to report 
symptoms of an STI because use of condoms is often higher among men with more education 
(Baker, Leon, and Collins 2011). In the population, education is positively associated with HIV 
testing (National Statistics Office [Malawi] and ICF Macro 2011) and I expected to find the 
same relationship here. Last, because of the varied relationship between education and HIV risk 
behaviors, and because HIV positive status is not strongly associated with education in the 
population (National Statistics Office [Malawi] and ICF Macro 2011), I had no prior 
expectations about the direction of the relationship between education and self-assessed risk of 
HIV.    
An estimate of how much the respondent spent during the month preceding the survey 
was used as a proxy measure for wealth. Income was not a good measure because few of the 
respondents had salaried positions, and their income varied substantially month-to-month. 
Instead, the amount spent on basic items—clothes, medical expenses, food, transportation, and 
cell phone airtime—was used to capture economic well-being. To create an estimate of total 
monthly expenses, the amount spent on each of the basic items was summed, converted so that 
each unit was the equivalent of $100 U.S. Dollars, and logged to reduce the skew in the 
distribution. As mentioned above, I expected a positive association between monthly 
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expenditures and number of sex partners because material resources are used to attract partners. 
The relationship with STI symptoms was hard to predict because it depends on the use of 
condoms. Based on DHS data, I expected a positive correlation between expenditures and HIV 
testing (National Statistics Office [Malawi] and ICF Macro 2011). As with education, I had no 
prior expectations regarding the relationship between expenditures and self-assessed risk. 
The models of self-assessed risk also include controls for whether the respondent thought 
his primary sexual partner had multiple partners and his estimate of the prevalence of HIV in his 
neighborhood. Trust in the faithfulness of primary partner was measured at baseline with a 
question asking the respondent to choose among a series of statements to characterize his 
assessment of his partner’s behavior. Responses were dichotomized so that men who either 
suspected or knew that their primary partner had one or more other partners are coded 0, and 
men who thought or knew that their partner had no other partners are coded 1. Unfortunately, 
this same measure was not available in the follow-up survey data, so I have used the baseline 
measure and assumed some consistency in the level of trust in the respondents’ relationships. 
Approximately 120 of the respondents had never had a sexual partner. Those respondents were 
coded as having a faithful partner, since they had eliminated the risk due to a partner’s 
unfaithfulness by remaining abstinent (whether or not by choice). Despite having a relatively 
weak measure, I expected respondents who did not trust their partners to be faithful to be more 
likely to report an elevated risk of HIV. Finally, an estimate of HIV prevalence was obtained 
during the follow-up survey by asking, “If we took a group of 10 people from this area—just 
normal people who live around you —how many of them do you think would now have 
HIV/AIDS?” Responses range between 0 and 10. I expected higher levels of perceived 
prevalence of HIV to be associated with greater odds of high self-assessed risk of HIV.  
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In addition to the quantitative survey, in-depth interviews were conducted with a 
stratified random sub-sample of the survey participants. In all, 64 men participated in interviews 
that lasted between 45 minutes and 3 hours and were conducted by male Malawian interviewers. 
The first half of the interview focused on beliefs and attitudes about circumcision. The second 
half included questions about a broader range of sexual and reproductive health behaviors, such 
as their relationship with their most recent partner and HIV testing, as well as questions designed 
to interrogate gender ideologies. For example, in the last section of each in-depth interview, the 
participant was asked, “In general, around here, what are some of the things that men do to earn 
the admiration/respect of their male peers?” and “When Malawians say that someone is a real 
man, what do they consider?” The interviews were conducted in Chichewa and subsequently 
translated into English and transcribed by the interviewers. 
 
Analytic Approach 
The quantitative analysis proceeded in stages. I began by examining the bivariate relationship 
between the GEM scale score and each of the sexual health behaviors. Bar charts displaying the 
mean level of the dependent variable for each score on the GEM scale gave a visual picture of 
the relationship without imposing a functional form. To test for statistical significance, I 
conducted bivariate OLS regression predicting number of sexual partners and bivariate logistic 
regression predicting the odds of having experienced symptoms of an STI or having tested for 
HIV. Finally, I introduced a standard set of controls to each regression model. These models 
tested whether the attitudinal measures were more than just reflections of variation in 
socioeconomic status by examining whether the associations with the GEM scale score remained 
significant when holding constant age, years of education, and monthly expenditures.  
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Tests for an association between gender attitudes and self-assessed HIV risk consisted of 
three sequential logistic regression models for both measures of perceived risk. The first model 
included only the GEM scale score. Second, I examined whether the association remained when 
the standard demographic controls were introduced. Finally, I wished to know whether there was 
a direct link between gender attitudes and self-assessed HIV risk, or if the association was 
entirely mediated by the behavior of the respondent and others in his network. I added three 
measures designed to capture the respondent’s perception of risk due to their own behavior, the 
behavior of their partners, and the behaviors of others in their community. Specifically, the last 
model includes controls for the respondent’s number of partners in the past year, whether the 
respondent thought his partner was faithful, and the respondent’s estimate of the HIV rate in his 
community. While this is not a complete set of controls, it is a first step in testing whether there 
is a direct connection between gender attitudes and self-assessed risk, independent of sexual 
behaviors.  
The qualitative data analysis also included multiple steps. I read each transcript in full as 
it was produced and took note of common themes. Those common themes were used as initial 
codes for detailed coding of the transcripts using HyperResearch. Three themes were particularly 
relevant to this study: sexual prowess as a marker of masculinity, HIV risk, and HIV testing. 
Text relating to each of those themes was extracted and reviewed in detail. Finally, once the 
quantitative analysis was complete, I reread the interview transcripts, paying particular attention 
to respondents’ own interpretations of the relationships that were tested in the quantitative 
analysis. Representative excerpts were extracted and are included along with the quantitative 




Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables. Men 
averaged nearly two sexual partners in the past year. Eleven percent of respondents reported 
experiencing symptoms of an STI in the month preceding the survey and 72 percent said they 
had been tested for HIV. The last two dependent variables explore men’s subjective assessment 
of their risk of HIV. Twenty-three percent of respondents believed that there was a medium to 
high chance that they were already infected with HIV; and 14 percent thought they had a higher 
than average risk of becoming infected with HIV in the future. As expected, these rates of 
subjective perception of risk are higher than similar rates from rural areas of Malawi where HIV 
prevalence is lower (Anglewicz and Kohler 2009).  
 
 
The second set of rows in Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for the independent 





Number of sex partners last year 1.82 2.25 0 30
Symptoms of STI in past month 0.11 0.31 0 1
Ever tested for HIV 0.72 0.45 0 1
High/medium chance HIV positive now 0.23 0.42 0 1
Relatively high risk of HIV in future 0.14 0.34 0 1
Independent variables
GEM Scale score 6.21 2.75 0 13
Age 26.66 5.40 16 52
Years of education 11.05 2.39 0 14
Expenditures last month (USD) 143.95 166.07 0 2000
Believe partner is faithful (from baseline) 0.37 0.48 0 1
Number HIV positive out of 10 people 5.04 2.00 0 10
Notes: Based on the analytic sample of 1117 respondents.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
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average respondent age was 27 and respondents had completed an average of 11 years of 
schooling. The mean amount spent on basic items in the month before the survey was the 
equivalent of $144. That the standard deviation of expenditures was $166 is an indication that 
there was considerable variation in expenditures among survey respondents. As of the baseline 
survey, only 37 percent of respondents believed that their primary partner had no other partners. 
Finally, on average, respondents estimated that 5 out of 10 people in their neighborhood were 
infected with HIV, which is much higher than the actual prevalence rate. I now turn to the 
analysis of the results. 
 
Gender Attitudes and Sexual Health Behaviors 
The analyses found strong associations between gender attitudes and sexual behaviors that were 
related to HIV risk, which are graphically displayed in Figures 3.2-3.4. Figure 3.2 shows that the 
mean number of sex partners in the past year decreased as the GEM scale score increased. The 
error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval range. The confidence intervals are large for 
the lowest and highest GEM scale 
scores because there were few 
respondents at the tails of the 
distribution. The statistically 
significant negative association 
between gender attitudes and 
number of sex partners is 
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Figure 3.2: Mean # of Sex Partners in Past 
Year by GEM Score 
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bivariate OLS regression model 1. The bivariate model indicates that, on average, men at the 
high end of the GEM scale who were more supportive of gender equity had approximately 2 
fewer sex partners in the year prior to the survey than did men at the low end of the GEM scale 
who held relatively inequitable gender attitudes.15  
This relationship was further explored in model 2, which controlled for age, education, 
and expenditures. The addition of controls to the model provided additional information on who 
had relatively more sexual partners, but it did not account for the relationship between gender 
attitudes and number of sexual partners. In particular, model 2 shows that expenditures (wealth 
proxy) was associated with greater numbers of sexual partners, which is consistent with previous 
studies that have shown that wealth is used to attract partners and that resource exchange is an 
important part of intimate relationships in Malawi (Swidler and Watkins 2007). Nonetheless, 
gender attitudes remained an important predictor of number of sexual partners, even when 
controlling for age, education, and wealth. 
                                                
15 The relationship remained statistically significant and was of similar magnitude when the measure of number of 




The in-depth interviews provided evidence that having multiple sexual partners was a 
commonly recognized strategy for proving masculine achievement. This particular construction 
of masculinity, which emphasized the sexual conquest of women, was likely associated with 
relatively inequitable gender attitudes. Adam, who was age 27, said, “There are some [men] that 
are famous for having many girlfriends to say, ‘this one, he has that woman, that woman, this 
one is a man.’ When it is us who do not manage to propose [sex to women], they say that this 
one is a ‘fule’ [a castrated man].” For Adam, “real men” had sex with many women. Victor, age 
25, confirmed that men are motivated to have many partners in order to impress their peers: 
“What they mostly talk about is on having some extra marital affairs. Outside marital 
relationships so that their fellow men should respect them.” The interviewer then asked, “And 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6


















































n 1117 1117 1117 1117 1117 1117
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03
Table 3.3: Gender Attitudes and Sexual Health Behaviors
Ever tested for HIV
(Odds ratios from 
logistic regression)
Symptoms of STI
(Odds ratios from 
logistic regression)
Sex partners last year
(OLS regression)
Notes: Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Models 1&2 
present coefficients from OLS regression. Models 3-6 present odds ratios from logistic regression.
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this earns them respect?” And Victor said, “Yes, and that is why they do it.” Men who used this 
social norm to guide their behavior put themselves at higher risk of HIV infection if they do not 
use condoms.  
Knowing the health consequences of having multiple sexual partners, many men regarded 
this masculine expectation as problematic, but acknowledged its existence and its power 
nonetheless. Francis (age 23) said that a man was admired when he “likes to sleep around with 
women…” Francis himself was praised for his sexual prowess, although he knew that he was 
risking his health by having sex with many women. He said, “when they say this one is a real 
man... That saying just aims at destroying you.” Despite his understanding of the associated 
health risks, Francis enjoyed the praise and flattery that he received because he had many sexual 
partners. He accepted and enacted a model of masculinity that privileged having sex with many 
women, despite the risks. 
Figure 3.3 examines the relationship between gender attitudes and experience of sexually 
transmitted infections (STIs). It shows that men who were more supportive of gender equity had 
a lower likelihood of having an STI in the month prior to the survey, when compared with men 
who expressed inequitable gender attitudes. Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.3 show odds ratios from 
logistic regressions predicting recent experience of STI symptoms. The bivariate model shows 
that with each additional point on the GEM scale, respondents had 0.9 times the odds of STI 
symptoms. Translated into predicted probabilities, it means that men at the low end of the GEM 
scale had approximately 10 percent higher probability of reporting an STI symptom than those at 
the high end of the scale. Model 4 shows that more equitable gender attitudes continued to be 
associated with lower odds of STI symptoms, although the coefficient was no longer statistically 
significant in the multivariate model. In this model, education captured some of the variation 
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initially explained by gender attitudes. Education may be an important explanation for 
differential rates of STIs because education is positively associated with contraceptive use 
(National Statistics Office [Malawi] and ICF Macro 2011). The use of condoms may also explain 
why wealthy men, who had greater numbers of partners, did not appear to have higher rates of 
STIs in this sample.  
 
In the in-depth interviews, a few respondents described uncontrollable masculine sexual 
desires as reasons for experiencing STIs. For example, Christopher, who is 25 years old, 
illustrates, “one may use protection against STIs, but you may not always be ready to do that 
[use a condom]. You may want to have sex when you do not have condoms. In my case, I travel 
quite a lot. I was in Zomba yesterday and I might be travelling to Karonga today. Such things 
happen. It may happen sometimes that we have a breakdown and you are found at an awkward 
place unexpectedly and forced to sleep. You may have sexual desires that you cannot control. 
You may not have an opportunity to use a condom.” Uncontrollable sexual desires were integral 
to the performance of certain types 
of masculinity. The quantitative 
results showed that 58 percent of 
the sample agreed that men were 
always ready to have sex and 74 
percent agreed that men need other 
women, even if things with their 
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masculine image based on sexual prowess made behavioral choices in a context where “real 
men” did not turn down an opportunity for sex because of a lack of protection. In this way, 
gender attitudes may have influenced men’s risk of contracting STIs. 
Figure 3.4 and models 5 and 6 in Table 3.3 show that men with more equitable gender 
attitudes were more likely to have ever been tested for HIV than those with less equitable 
attitudes, even when controlling 
for age and socioeconomic status. 
The odds ratio of 1.10 means that, 
holding other variables constant at 
their mean, men at the low end of 
the GEM scale had about a 0.6 
predicted probability of having 
been tested for HIV, while at the 
high end of the GEM scale, men 
had greater than a 0.8 predicted probability of having been tested. This is an important difference 
in a place where universal testing is encouraged as an important strategy for increasing access to 
treatment and thereby combating the spread of HIV.  
In some of the in-depth interviews, men suggested that those who do not test were those 
who have had unprotected sex with many women and who were afraid to know their HIV status. 
Zachariah, age 34, explained, “Young men who are sexually active are afraid of knowing their 
status. They feel they have already contracted HIV and are tensed up.” Markus, age 29, was one 
of those men. He said, “...I feel like if I can go there to get tested, there they will tell me, ‘Oh, we 
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disinclined to get tested for HIV. It follows, therefore, that men whose masculine identity was 
based on their sexual prowess were less likely to get tested.  
 
Gender Attitudes and Self-Assessed HIV Risk 
The second part of the analysis examined associations between men’s gender attitudes and their 
subjective assessment of their own risk of HIV infection. All of the coefficients presented in the 
six models in Table 4 are odds ratios based on logistic regression. Models 7-9 indicate that men 
with more equitable gender attitudes were less likely to report that they had a medium or high 
chance of currently being infected with HIV. The coefficients in these models translate into 
substantial effect sizes. The predicted probability that a respondent reported that he had a 
medium or high chance of being HIV positive ranged from about 0.14 among those with the 
most equitable gender attitudes to a predicted probability greater than 0.3 among those with the 




Gender attitudes remained an important predictor when controlling for the types of 
variables included in previous studies of self-assessed HIV risk (Anglewicz and Kohler 2009). 
Model 8 controlled for age, years of education, and expenditures. Higher levels of education 
were associated with lower odds of reporting medium to high risk of HIV infection, but 
controlling for education did not eliminate the association with gender attitudes. Model 9 
included controls for the respondent’s sexual behavior, as well as his perception of his partner’s 
behavior and of HIV prevalence in his community. Not surprisingly, the respondent’s reported 
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n 1117 1117 1117 1117 1117 1117
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.07
Notes: Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. All models 
present odds ratios from logistic regression.
Table 3.4: Subjective HIV Risk Assessment
Medium or high chance of 
current HIV infection
Higher risk than average of 
future HIV infection
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number of sex partners in the previous year was positively associated with his probability of 
reporting that there was a medium or high chance that he was already infected with HIV. Men in 
this area were aware that having multiple sex partners increased their risk of becoming infected 
with HIV. Including the control for the number of sexual partners in the past year accounted for 
some, but not all of the association between gender attitudes and self-assessed risk. Whether the 
respondent thought that his primary partner had other partners as of the baseline survey was not 
related to his self-assessed risk. This may be due to the weakness of the measure. The 
respondent’s estimate of the HIV prevalence among people in his neighborhood likewise was not 
associated with his perceived risk. 
Models 10-12 show similar findings: men with more equitable gender attitudes were less 
likely to say that they had a higher than average risk of HIV infection in the future, even when 
controlling for common predictors of self-assessed risk. Men with the most equitable attitudes 
had a predicted probability of approximately 0.06 of reporting that they were at higher than 
average risk. Respondents with the least equitable attitudes had a predicted probability greater 
than 0.2 of reporting higher than average risk of future HIV infection. Controlling for one aspect 
of the respondent’s sexual behavior (number of sexual partners in the past year), his perception 
of the sexual behavior of his partner, and his assessment of HIV prevalence did little to explain 
the association between gender attitudes and self-assessed risk of future HIV infection. Model 12 
shows that respondents with greater numbers of sexual partners were more likely to report that 
they were at higher than average risk of HIV. Also, interestingly, the greater the HIV prevalence 
rate perceived by the respondent, the greater his probability of reporting that he had a higher than 
average risk of future HIV infection. Nonetheless, controlling for sexual behaviors of the 
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respondent and others in his community does not completely explain the association between 
gender attitudes and self-assessed HIV risk. 
In the interview transcripts, evidence for an association between gender attitudes and 
self-assessed risk of HIV appeared in discussions about HIV testing. As part of a demonstration 
of masculinity, some men claimed that they must be HIV positive because they had many “risky” 
sexual experiences (also see Kaler 2003). Since they could already assume their HIV status, 
therefore, there was no reason to get tested. Gibson, age 24, remarked that he heard this 
reasoning from his friends: “When we are having our discussions as young men, what comes out 
as one of the reasons for not testing is the self-doubt of being found to be HIV positive. Some 
young men don't want to know their HIV status because for sure they are aware that the women 
they had sex with had sex with another man before them. So they are afraid of knowing their HIV 
status.” Gibson’s friends were simultaneously making the claim that they were masculine men 
who have a lot of sex and that they were at high risk of HIV.  
Edward, age 27, associated being a man with engaging in sexual behaviors that put him at 
risk of sexually transmitted infections. He described his behavioral choices as an inevitable result 
of the fact that he is a man. He explained, “So, I am a man. [I think] ‘I should drink one [beer] 
here.’ You may meet prostitutes, yeah. When you meet those prostitutes you do things under 
intoxication and you cannot remember a condom. You just say, ‘Ah, you, I will give you money. 
Let us have sex here.’ So, those things can cause a person... you will find that you will do that 
alright, but you will find that [after] three days, four days something has started itching in the 
body, yeah.” Edward asserted his masculinity by claiming that he had uncontrollable sexual 
urges and by disregarding risk for the sake of sexual satisfaction. His assertion that he was at risk 
of sexually transmitted infections was part of the construction of his masculine self-image.  
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Men like Edward were at high risk of HIV because they engaged in sexual behaviors that 
increase one’s risk of infection. In addition, regardless of their actual behavior, their masculine 
self-image was based, in part, on their high level of risk. It is important to note that Edward’s 
behavior and his rationalization of his behavior were by no means representative of all interview 
respondents. Although many men would have disapproved of Edward’s behavior (and there were 
plenty of responses in the interviews that indicated that men tried to distance themselves from 
this type of behavior), most men recognized the existence of this cultural script linking 
masculinity with high levels of HIV risk. A man’s subjective assessment of his own risk of HIV, 
therefore, may reflect both the objective riskiness of his behaviors and his self-image about what 
kind of man he is. 
 
Discussion 
The findings of this study provide an important foundation for much needed additional research 
on gender attitudes, masculinity, and sexual health behaviors in Malawi and beyond. First, the 
Gender Equitable Men (GEM) scale proved useful in capturing variation in urban Malawian 
men’s attitudes about gender. The percent of men giving the gender equitable response to each 
scale item varied from 21 percent to 90 percent. The scale captures both attitudes about 
masculinity and attitudes about gender relations/equality. Statements intended to capture ideals 
of masculinity include “I would feel weak if I asked for help”; “Men are always ready to have 
sex”; and “A man needs other women, even if things are fine with his wife.” It is worth noting 
that 80 percent of respondents agreed or partially agreed with that last statement. This finding, by 
itself, provides motivation for further research on the role of masculine ideals in promoting the 
spread of HIV in urban Malawi. Recent studies have shown that concurrent sexual partnerships 
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are an important driver of the HIV epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa (Mah and Halperin 2010). 
Moreover, men’s social networks seem to play a large role in encouraging concurrent 
partnerships (Clark 2010; Cordero Coma 2013). This study shows that the encouragement that 
men receive from their social networks to have multiple sexual partners is likely part of the 
social construction of masculine ideals. 
The attitude that “real men” need multiple partners has also been recognized in places 
such as South Africa (Hunter 2005; Walker 2005). Hunter (2005) documents the rise of the isoka 
masculine ideal, which is based on securing multiple sexual partners. He argues that high 
unemployment undermined many historical avenues for expressing manliness—especially 
becoming the head of an independent household—which led to the rise in prominence of the 
isoka masculinity. Hunter, and others (Walker 2005; Morrell 2001; Lynch, Brouard, and Visser 
2010; Dworkin et al. 2012), however, also document men’s increasing doubts about this form of 
masculinity in the face of the high death tolls caused by HIV/AIDS. Masculinity is never 
singular or static (Connell 1995; Morrell 1998) and in-depth research is needed to examine the 
ways in which men in Malawi express their manliness, and the ways in which ideals of 
masculinity are shifting in the context of the threat of HIV. Given the responses to the GEM 
scale items in this study, it is clear that many, but not all, Malawian men regard sexual behaviors 
as a mode of establishing manhood. This makes the study of masculinities important to the study 
of HIV risk.  
GEM scale items capturing attitudes about gender relations also point to inequitable 
gender norms as potentially influential in HIV risk. Relevant scale items include “It is a woman’s 
responsibility to avoid getting pregnant when a pregnancy is not wanted”; “A man should have 
the final word about decisions in his home”; and “It is the man who decides when to have sex.” 
 84 
Among the survey respondents, only 25 percent disagreed with the last statement, indicating an 
expectation that men control sexual encounters. By influencing the character of negotiations 
regarding safe sex practices, this inequitable gender norm also has the potential to affect the 
spread of HIV (Varga 2003). 
 The results of the regression analyses show that gender attitudes are correlated with 
sexual health behaviors that influence men’s risk of HIV infection, including number of sexual 
partners, experience of STIs, and testing for HIV. The results show that total monthly 
expenditure is an important predictor of number of sexual partners. Nonetheless, even when 
controlling for expenditures and education, gender attitudes continue to predict number of 
partners. This is suggestive evidence that gender attitudes, including ideals of masculinity, 
provide motivation (or post-hoc rationalization) for having multiple sexual partners, despite the 
associated risk of HIV. It is also clear that not all Malawian men support a masculine ideology 
that privileges sexual prowess and that this variation is linked to variation in sexual behaviors. 
As noted in other study settings, such variation in masculine ideals can provide openings for 
social and cultural change (Morrell 2001; Hunter 2005; Walker 2005).  
 The results also show a somewhat weak association between gender attitudes and recent 
experience of STI symptoms. This is further evidence that gender attitudes are associated with 
HIV risk. Men who have STIs have evidently had unprotected sex, which means they have 
recently put themselves at risk of HIV infection. In addition, men with STIs are at higher risk of 
acquiring HIV from an HIV positive partner (WHO 2006), which means that they have an 
elevated future risk of HIV as well. In Malawi, HIV prevalence is considerably higher among 
those who have had STI symptoms than among those who have not experienced an STI 
(National Statistics Office [Malawi] and ICF Macro 2011).  
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 The analysis also documents an association between gender attitudes and HIV testing. 
Men with more equitable gender attitudes are substantially more likely to have ever been tested 
for HIV. There is relatively easy access to HIV testing in this urban setting (National Statistics 
Office [Malawi] and ICF Macro 2011), so differential access, although unmeasured, is unlikely 
to explain this finding. HIV testing is important so that HIV positive individuals can access 
treatment, which can improve their life chances and reduce their risk of transmitting the virus to 
others. Men in Malawi generally over-estimate the transmissibility of HIV and, given the 
prevalence of the disease, men often assume they are HIV positive because they have not always 
practiced safe sex (Anglewicz and Kohler 2009; Kaler and Watkins 2010). This can be used to 
justify the continuation of unprotected sex with multiple partners on the assumption that they are 
already infected. HIV testing could encourage such men to re-evaluate their sexual behaviors.  
 A far greater percentage of Malawian adult women have been tested for HIV in their 
lifetimes (73 percent) than Malawian adult men (53 percent) (National Statistics Office [Malawi] 
and ICF Macro 2011). Much of this discrepancy is due to the fact that women are routinely 
tested when they seek antenatal care. The association between men’s gender attitudes and HIV 
testing may also prove to be part of the explanation for lower testing rates among men. Men with 
relatively inequitable gender attitudes may opt not to get tested because they already assume they 
are HIV positive and/or because getting tested for HIV implies an unmanly willingness to 
prioritize health over the satisfaction of sexual desires.   
 Finally, this study is the first to document a quantitative correlation between gender 
attitudes and self-assessed risk of HIV. It is possible that this association is mediated entirely by 
a corresponding association between gender attitudes and sexual behaviors. As demonstrated in 
the first set of analyses, men with less equitable gender attitudes are more likely to engage in 
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some of the behaviors that are associated with HIV risk. And, the analysis of self-assessed risk 
showed that a higher number of sex partners in the year preceding the survey was associated with 
a higher likelihood of reporting medium or high risk of HIV infection. Other unmeasured aspects 
of sexual relationships may further explain the association between gender attitudes and 
subjective risk assessment. For example, men with less equitable gender attitudes may be less 
likely to use condoms with casual sex partners or more likely to pay prostitutes for sex. These 
men may accurately assess that they are at higher than average risk of HIV. Thus, at least part of 
the explanation for the association between gender attitudes and subjective perception of HIV 
risk is that men who hold less equitable gender attitudes engage in more risky sexual behaviors, 
and, knowing that they are putting themselves at risk, reasonably assume there is a relatively 
high chance that they are infected with HIV. The same explanation could apply to the association 
between gender attitudes and future risk of HIV, presuming that men with less equitable gender 
attitudes intend to continue engaging in risky sexual behaviors. The current survey does not 
include enough measures of sexual behavior to fully examine this potential explanation.  
It is also possible, however, that the association between self-assessed risk of HIV and 
gender attitudes is not driven entirely by behavioral differences. Kaler’s (2003) work in rural 
Malawi shows that some men construct a masculine self-image that is based on insatiable sexual 
desire and sexual prowess, and the attendant higher risk of HIV. It is plausible that some men 
evaluate their risk of HIV based on their self-image in addition to an objective assessment of the 
riskiness of their sexual behaviors. Existing studies show that the formation of risk perceptions is 
a social process (Buhler and Kohler 2003; Kohler, Behrman, and Watkins 2007). It is possible 
that centrality of sexual prowess to the construction of masculinity within a man’s social network 
affects both his sexual behaviors and his subjective assessment of his risk of contracting HIV. If 
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so, encouraging men to accurately assess their HIV risk may require asking them to examine 
norms of masculinity in their social networks. Unfortunately, these data do not provide the tools 
necessary to fully evaluate this possible explanation. The results do show, however, that gender 
attitudes remain a significant predictor of self-assessed risk, even when controlling for a number 
of factors that are central to HIV risk.   
 In addition to having a limited number of measures of sexual behavior, there are several 
other limitations to this study. First and foremost, the analyses are based on cross-sectional data, 
so no conclusions can be drawn about causal effects. The observed associations could result from 
gender attitudes influencing sexual behaviors or vice versa. For example, I have hypothesized 
above that men with less equitable gender attitudes will be less likely to seek HIV testing. 
However, it is possible that the causal direction is reversed: interactions with clinic personnel in 
the process of HIV testing may influence men’s gender attitudes.  
 The data are also limited in coverage and content. The sample includes only urban men. 
Additional studies that include women and are more expansive in geographic scope are 
warranted. Future studies would also do well to include more detailed measures of demographic 
and socioeconomic status, more information on sexual behavior, as well as measures of 
behavioral intentions and motivations, which can begin to illuminate the mechanisms linking 
gender attitudes and sexual behaviors.  
 This study was an initial investigation of the relationship between gender attitudes and 
HIV risk among urban Malawian men. The findings show that the GEM scale is useful for 
capturing variation in gender attitudes in this setting. Results also demonstrate an association 
between gender attitudes and both objective measures of sexual health behaviors that are linked 
to the spread of HIV, and subjective self-assessed HIV risk. While preliminary, the results 
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suggest that there is need for further research on gender attitudes and how they relate to sexual 
health behaviors in Malawi and beyond.
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Chapter 4 
“A Real Man is Recognized by What He Does”: Schemas of Masculinity and Fertility 
 
Introduction 
This paper issues a call for greater attention to cultural constructions of masculinity in fertility 
research. The data document contemporary conceptions of masculinity among young men in 
urban Malawi. They show that masculine ideals are imbued with beliefs that are relevant to 
fertility preferences and behaviors. The findings suggest that examinations of the influence of 
conceptions of masculinity on fertility outcomes would be a fruitful line of research. Such 
research would represent a continuation of scholars’ efforts to use gender theory to enhance 
fertility research.   
In the past few decades, demographers have responded to calls to incorporate gender 
theory into fertility research. Until the 1990s, demographic research on fertility focused almost 
exclusively on the preferences and behavior of women (Becker 1996; Dodoo 1998; Dodoo and 
Frost 2008). Data on fertility were collected from women both because of a cultural association 
of women with childbearing and because it was easier: women have clearly defined reproductive 
life spans, are more likely to be found at home, and are often responsible for children from 
marriages that are no longer intact (Greene and Biddlecom 2000; Zhang 2011). Theories of 
fertility behavior thus treated married couples as the unit of analysis and focused on the decisions
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of women within that unit, largely ignoring the possibility of disagreements or conflict about 
fertility behaviors within the couple. 
More recently, demographers have called attention to the unequal distribution of 
decision-making power and access to resources and information within childbearing 
relationships (Mason 1987; Riley 1999; Watkins 1993). The Program of Action produced at the 
1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo was instrumental in 
pressing policymakers and researchers to pay attention to the effects of gender inequality on 
demographic processes (Presser 1997). Since then, research has demonstrated that women do not 
make fertility decisions alone. Men’s fertility preferences are varied (Mason and Taj 1987; Ezeh 
et al. 1996; Ngom 1997; Dodoo 1998) and are highly influential on fertility outcomes (Ezeh 
1993; Bankole 1995; Becker 1996; Bankole and Singh 1998; Dodoo 1998; Bawah et al. 1999; 
DeRose and Ezeh 2005; Zhang 2011). Recent reviews, especially those focused on fertility in 
sub-Saharan Africa, conclude that men play a dominant role in decision-making regarding family 
planning (Blanc 2001; Dodoo and Frost 2008). Starting with an emphasis on gender inequality, 
much of this research investigates the relative power of men and women to control reproduction 
(Greene and Biddlecom 2000). 
This attentiveness to gender inequality has greatly enhanced our understanding of how 
couples make decisions about childbearing. Nonetheless, criticisms remain that gender theory 
has been only partially incorporated into demographic research, thus leaving unexplored some of 
the ways that gender influences demographic processes (Mason 1995; Greene and Biddlecom 
2000; Blanc 2001; Dodoo and Frost 2008). Men’s preferences have often been taken for granted 
and men have been studied primarily with regard to how they influence the fertility behavior of 
their wives. The reasons for variation in the reproductive preferences and behaviors of men 
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themselves remain under-researched. As noted by Agadjanain (2002), “little attention has been 
devoted to factors and mechanisms that shape, modify, and legitimize men’s fertility preferences 
and choices” (195). Given the empirical evidence demonstrating that men are influential in 
decisions about reproduction, more research on predictors of men’s fertility preferences and 
behaviors is required to further our understanding of fertility outcomes and trends.  
Bringing in another piece of gender theory, this paper presents qualitative evidence from 
Malawi showing that ideals of masculinity often make reference to men’s fertility behaviors. The 
findings suggest that conceptions of masculinity may be a central ideational influence on men’s 
fertility preferences and behaviors. Recent research has recognized the importance of cultural 
and ideational factors, in addition to economic and social structural factors, for demographic 
processes (Montgomery and Casterline 1996; Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Kertzer 1997; 
Barber and Axinn 2004; Thornton 2001; Casterline 2001; Thornton 2005; Jayakody et al. 2008). 
I argue that the investigation of social and cultural influences on fertility could be usefully 
expanded to include studies of conceptions of masculinity, referred to hereafter as ‘masculinity 
schemas.’  
Schemas are mental representations such as values and beliefs that inform how people 
understand the world around them and determine how to act in the world (Sewell 1992; Johnson-
Hanks et al. 2011). In other words, schemas are both models of the world and models for the 
world, informing people’s goals, interpretations of the actions of others, behavioral choices, and 
justifications of their own conduct (Geertz 1973; Thornton, Axinn, Fricke, and Alwin 2001). 
Extending this definition, masculinity schemas provide mental maps for action based on 
expectations for and evaluations of how men should behave (Campbell 1997; Walker 2005; 
Simpson 2007; Izugbara and Undie 2008; Macia, Maharaj, and Gresh 2011; Townsend et al. 
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2011). Men enact available schemas to build their sense of manhood and to perform their 
masculinity for others. Masculinity schemas offer models for how to understand relations 
between men and women and how men should behave to assert that they are successful men. As 
such, masculinity schemas are potentially important influences on fertility preferences and 
behaviors.  
As a significant life event, fathering a child can be integral to the production of a 
masculine identity (Morrell 2006). And yet, masculinity schemas have been largely ignored as an 
important ideational influence on men’s fertility preferences and behaviors. A search in Scopus 
for words beginning with “masculin” in the title, abstract, or keywords of articles in 
Demography, Population and Development Review, Populations Studies, Studies in Family 
Planning, and Demographic Research return only three relevant articles (and only one that 
directly addresses fertility outcomes). This gap in the literature is all the more surprising given 
the prominent attention to both ideational factors and gender systems in recent studies of fertility. 
The goal of this paper is to illustrate the relevance of contemporary masculinity schemas 
to men’s fertility preferences and behaviors. I begin by discussing current theories of masculinity 
to provide a theoretical apparatus on which the arguments of the rest of the paper are built. This 
is followed by an examination of existing literatures that contribute to the expectation that 
masculinity schemas are imbued with beliefs relevant to men’s fertility. In the second half of the 
paper, I draw on qualitative data collected in urban Malawi in 2011 to explore the fertility-related 
elements of masculinity schemas in one particular setting.    
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Theories of Masculinity 
I suggested above that masculinity schemas are an additional, and thus far underappreciated, 
cultural element that may have bearing on fertility trends and behaviors. In this section, I review 
three tenets of masculinity theory that are most relevant to the study of fertility. 
1. Masculinity is not biological. Existing literature affirms that masculinity is neither 
biologically determined nor automatically ascribed to all men (Morrell 2006). Instead, men must 
assert their manhood by enacting masculinity schemas, which are based on shared 
understandings of masculine ideals (Connell 1995). Masculinity schemas are continuously 
performed through actions and interactions with others, and are also learned through those 
interactions (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). For individual men, especially men of relatively 
low social status, the achievement of a masculine image is fragile and in need of constant 
reinforcement (Izugbara and Undie 2008). Individuals have agency (although not unlimited 
options) in how they enact masculinity schemas, and the accumulation of those individual 
choices, whether conscious or not, has the potential to reinforce or to modify shared 
constructions of masculinity. Demographic studies should note that fertility-related behaviors—
including choice of sexual partners, use of contraception, and childbearing—are common social 
domains for the enactment of masculinity schemas. 
2. Masculinity schemas are variable. Another important finding is that schemas of 
masculinity, and the types of behavior used to perform masculinity, vary across time and social 
contexts (Morrell 1998; Reid and Walker 2005). Like all elements of cultural systems, 
conceptions of masculinity tend to be relatively stable, but can and do change gradually over 
time. Studies of masculinity schemas in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, have shown that global 
social processes, such as missionary activity, colonialism, and changes in the structure of the 
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economy, caused shifts in local conceptions of masculinity (Phiri 1983; Vaughan 1987; Davison 
1993; Morrell 2001; Pattman 2001; Silberschmidt 2001; Hunter 2010). Such trajectories of 
change depend on both historical constructions of masculinity and contemporary realities. 
Competition between different schemas of masculinity, or between schemas of masculinity and 
material realities, can create openings for social change. For example, historical notions that 
powerful and successful men have many children may compete with contemporary family 
planning campaigns that depict families with many children as poor and tired when compared 
with families with only two children, depicted as comfortable and happy. This implies that 
research on fertility should be attentive to the possibility that demographic shifts can cause 
changes in masculinity schemas, and, vice versa—that changes in masculinity schemas can cause 
systematic change in demographic behaviors. 
3. Resources are required to assert masculinity. Last, the literature has demonstrated that 
multiple masculinity schemas exist within any one social context. As has been observed of other 
ideational influences on demographic behavior (Jayakody et al. 2008), schemas of masculinity, 
and the ability to enact various images of masculinity, are unevenly distributed across society. 
Morrell (2001:14) explains,  
Boys and men choose how to behave and this choice is made from 
a number of available repertoires. Such choices are never entirely 
free, because the available repertoires differ from context to 
context and because the resources from which masculinity is 
constructed are unevenly distributed. 
 
Thus, men in different social positions have different resources available to them for the 
enactment of masculinity schemas and the successful construction of a masculine identity 
(Connell 1995). Further, men “wield and access power” in different ways, depending on their 
status in other domains, such as class (Reid and Walker 2005: 7). Wealthier men can use 
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economic resources to demonstrate social power and masculine achievement, whereas men of 
limited economic means do not have that option (Sideris 2004; Hunter 2010). For fertility 
studies, then, it is important to note that variations in access to resources can influence men’s 
ability to enact different masculinity schemas, which can produce systematic variation in fertility 
patterns within a community.  
These three themes from the literature on masculinity provide a baseline for considering 
how studies of masculinity schemas can be usefully integrated into research on fertility. 
Masculinity schemas are an element of culture that has bearing on relations between men and 
women and, as such, are potentially significant in the study of fertility outcomes (see Bledsoe, 
Lerner, and Guyer 2000). With these principles in mind, I now turn to an examination of existing 
literature on masculinity schemas and sexual health. Findings from this literature also lead to the 
expectation that masculinity schemas will make reference to men’s fertility preferences and 
behaviors. 
 
Masculinity Schemas in Sexual Health Research 
Two bodies of literature provide suggestive evidence of the relevance of masculinity schemas to 
studies of fertility: 1) research on masculinity and sexual health; and 2) research on the 
association of gender attitudes and fertility preferences and behaviors.  
First, research on masculinity and sexual health has demonstrated that masculine 
identities are often asserted in the social domain of sexual behaviors (Courtenay 2000; 
Silberschmidt 2001; Kaler 2003; Williams 2003; Hunter 2005; Wyrod 2011). Much of this 
research is geared toward understanding behaviors associated with HIV/AIDS risk. For example, 
studies in Tanzania, South Africa, and Nigeria demonstrate that some men who have limited 
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economic means rely on sexual prowess to establish their masculinity (Silberschmidt 2001; 
Hunter 2010; Odimegwu et al. 2013). In these studies, men may have multiple sexual partners as 
a way of demonstrating their superior masculine status and of commanding the respect and 
admiration of their peers (Walker 2005). The behavioral choices of men in these studies are 
driven, at least in part, by a desire to conform to an image of masculinity that privileges sexual 
promiscuity.  
The existence of a version of masculinity that emphasizes sexual prowess, however, does 
not mean that all men choose to demonstrate their masculinity through promiscuity. In some 
places in sub-Saharan Africa men have reacted to evidence of the detrimental effects of HIV and 
violence against women by attempting to construct a model of masculinity rooted in equal 
gender relations (Morrell 2001; Sideris 2004; Lynch, Brouard, and Visser 2010; Dworkin et al. 
2012). These men tailor their sexual behaviors to conform to an alternative model of masculinity.  
All of these studies on masculinity and sexual health document the importance of 
constructions of masculinity for sexual behavioral choices, and many of them find that variation 
in the ways men choose to perform masculinity schemas is associated with variation in sexual 
behaviors. For the purposes of the current paper, it is important to note that the same social 
actions are often the objects of study in both research on sexual behaviors and research on 
fertility behaviors. For example, use of condoms may be viewed as a protection from sexually 
transmitted infections and/or as fertility limitation, depending on the research framework. Since 
masculinity schemas clearly influence sexual behavior, it is reasonable to assume that they may 
also be relevant to fertility behavior.  
 Studies of gender attitudes are a second line of research that provides evidence 
suggesting that masculinity schemas may be relevant to fertility outcomes. Gender attitudes 
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include individual beliefs about the proper roles for men and women in society, as well as beliefs 
about the ways in which they should behave and relate to one another. Personal ideals of 
masculinity and femininity are part of gender attitudes. Measures of gender attitudes may capture 
variation in propensity to aspire to different masculinity schemas that are rooted in more or less 
gender egalitarian ideologies. Because these concepts are related, it is worth reviewing literature 
on gender attitudes and fertility for clues as to how masculinity schemas and fertility outcomes 
may be related.  
Existing studies show that equitable gender attitudes are generally associated with 
smaller family sizes. In wealthy countries, men’s gender attitudes have been found to be 
associated with their fertility preferences and behaviors (Westhoff and Higgins 2009). Similarly, 
in Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya, equitable gender attitudes are associated with lower desired 
family size and/or higher contraceptive use (Isiugo-Abanihe 1994; Stephenson et al. 2012). 
Moreover, a recent study showed that men in East Africa with less equitable gender attitudes had 
relatively high fertility aspirations (Snow, Winter, and Harlow 2013). All of these studies 
indicate that gender attitudes are associated with fertility behaviors. It is reasonable, therefore, to 
hypothesize that masculinity schemas, which are an important component of gender attitudes, 
will also be associated with fertility behaviors. 
In sum, there are many indications that masculinity schemas are infused with messages 
about fertility. Existing research shows that conceptions of masculinity are relevant to sexual 
health behaviors. Other research demonstrates associations between gender attitudes and men’s 
fertility preferences and behaviors. All of this evidence suggests that studies of masculinity 
schemas may be pertinent to the study of fertility. In the following sections I describe the 
methods, analysis, and results of a study in Malawi that explored young men’s masculinity 
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schemas. While I do not have the data to examine how masculinity schemas affect fertility, my 
data do permit analysis of the masculinity schemas themselves. This is an important first step. 
The results show that masculinity schemas in this setting are indeed permeated by ideals relevant 
to fertility preferences and behaviors.    
 
Methods 
The data for this investigation were collected as part of a larger study on male circumcision for 
HIV prevention in Malawi that included both quantitative and qualitative components. The study 
began in 2010 with a baseline survey administered in an urban neighborhood to a random sample 
of uncircumcised men between the ages of 18 and 35. Questions about gender attitudes and 
sexual behaviors were included in the follow-up survey that was conducted about one year later. 
The follow-up survey achieved a response rate of nearly 77 percent, reaching approximately 
1,250 men. After the follow-up survey, a stratified random sub-sample of survey participants was 
selected to participate in in-depth interviews and the interview response rate was about 90 
percent. In addition to questions on circumcision, the interviews included sections on other 
sexual and reproductive health behaviors and beliefs about contemporary gender relations in 
Malawi. The majority of the data presented below come from the in-depth interview data, with 
supplemental information from the quantitative survey. Additional details on the study design 
can be found in Chinkhumba, Godlonton, and Thornton (2012). 
 
Research Site 
Contemporary urban Malawi, like much of Africa, is characterized by social transition and 
turbulence due to changing demographic and material conditions, and global and local ideational 
influences (Walker 2005). Both social norms regarding fertility (Sennott and Yeatman 2012) and 
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conceptions of masculinity (Reid and Walker 2005; Izugbara and Undie 2008) are in a state of 
flux. Men must navigate life choices and justify those choices in conditions of competing 
expectations (Walker 2005). This makes urban Malawi an interesting site for the examination of 
masculinity schemas and their relevance to fertility preferences and behaviors. 
Average fertility in Malawi has declined slowly in the past 20 years, but there is 
considerable heterogeneity in fertility preferences and behaviors within the country. According 
to Malawi’s first Demographic and Health Survey, women in 1992 gave birth to an average of 
6.7 children in their lifetimes (National Statistics Office and Macro International 1994). The total 
fertility rate (TFR) in 2010 was 5.7 for the country as a whole: 6.1 for rural areas, and 4.0 in 
urban areas (National Statistics Office [Malawi] and ICF Macro 2011). Fertility preferences 
among men vary substantially by location of residence and education. Average desired family 
size among men (and among women) is approximately 4 children, but this ranges from about 5 
children among rural men with no education to about 3 children among urban men with 
secondary or higher education. 
The neighborhood where the study was conducted is populated by low and middle-
income Malawians. It is accessible by public transportation from the main bus depot and the two 
main commercial and business centers of the city. The variety of house constructions provides 
visible evidence of the socio-economic heterogeneity. Houses range from mud structures in 
disrepair with no privacy fence to buildings made of cement with corrugated iron roofs, brick 
fences, and iron gates. The wealthier houses have electricity and water running directly to the 
house; others collect water from community water pumps and have no access to electricity. Most 
residents of the area rent their accommodations; relatively few well-off families own their own 
homes. 
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Among the participants in the qualitative interview sample, median monthly expenditures 
totaled $117 with a standard deviation of $93, indicating a relatively low-income sample, but one 
with considerable variation in wealth. Nearly all respondents are literate in both Chichewa and 
English and they have completed an average of 11 years of school. Almost one-fifth of the 
sample did not go beyond primary school, nearly 60 percent completed some or all of secondary 
school, and 25 percent has attended schooling beyond the secondary school level. 
 
Data Collection 
Both the survey questionnaire and the in-depth interviews were conducted in person by young 
male Malawian members of the research team. Most interactions between the research team and 
the participants occurred near the respondent’s home, which is where they were originally 
contacted, but the respondents were able to select a private location for each interview. Before 
each survey questionnaire or in-depth interview, respondents were informed of their rights as 
research participants and gave written informed consent. With additional consent, a digital audio 
recorder was used to record the in-depth interview. All respondents were offered 250 mobile 
phone airtime units (approx. value of $1.67) at the end of the survey and at the end of the 
interview to thank them for their participation.  
The bulk of the questions on the quantitative surveys interrogated sexual behaviors, 
knowledge and attitudes about circumcision, and circumcision-related behaviors. The follow-up 
survey also included a modified version of part of the Gender Equitable Men (GEM) scale, a 
newly developed measure of gender attitudes (Pulerwitz and Barker 2008). Responses to some of 
the items in the GEM scale that asked men to indicate their evaluation of common masculinity 
schemas are reviewed in the results section.  
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The in-depth interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 3 hours and were conducted 
primarily in Chichewa. Before data collection, the author trained the interviewers on the purpose 
of the study and the interview guide. Interview guide translation from English to Chichewa was 
done as part of the interviewer training, which facilitated further discussion of the interview 
goals. A third party back-translated the guide into English, providing an additional check of the 
translation. The first half of the interview focused on men’s knowledge, opinions, and experience 
related to circumcision. The second half was designed to examine men’s gender attitudes and the 
relationship between those attitudes and their sexual health and fertility behaviors. Interviewers 
asked the following two questions to capture masculinity schemas: 1) “In general, around here, 
what are some of the things that men do to earn the admiration/respect of their male peers?”; and 
2) “When Malawians say that someone is a real man, what do they consider?” The interviews 
were transcribed into Chichewa and English immediately upon completion and were read by the 
author as they were produced. Suggestions for how to improve the probing and targeting of 
questions were given for the subsequent interviews. 
 
Analysis and Limitations 
The analysis of the interview data was conducted by the author alone. Once the interviews were 
complete, detailed coding of masculinity schemas and fertility preferences was performed using 
HyperResearch, a commercial software package designed for the analysis of qualitative data. 
Each type of behavior that was described as admirable was coded as a separate masculinity 
schema. Fertility preferences were coded according to general themes, such as “good to have few 
children.” Coded segments of the interviews were extracted and reviewed again for 
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commonalities. Finally, the transcripts were read closely a fourth time with the specific aim of 
summarizing each respondent’s statements regarding masculinity and fertility.  
The data used for this study have several limitations. The interview sample was not 
purposively selected for the study of masculinity schemas and fertility, nor is it representative of 
the men who live in this area of Lilongwe. Only uncircumcised men were eligible for 
participation in the baseline survey, which means that Muslim men and men from ethnic groups 
that regularly practice circumcision as part of a rite of passage (primarily Yao men) are excluded 
from the sample. In addition, the sample of in-depth interview participants was selected to ensure 
variation in circumcision status as of the follow-up survey and, therefore, men who opted to get 
circumcised in the year after the baseline survey are substantially over-represented among 
interview respondents. Only a small minority of men in the study chose to undergo circumcision 
between the baseline and follow-up surveys and those who did are likely unusual in 
unobservable ways. They may be more attune to the risk of HIV, more agentic in their responses 
to the threat of HIV, more open to the advice and influence of outsiders, or simply more willing 
to try new things. These characteristics may also be related to the ways in which these men 
choose to enact masculinity schemas. In sum, data from this interview sample cannot be 
generalized to men in the neighborhood from which it was drawn or to any larger geographic 
area.  
Another important aspect of the design is the choice to only interview men. Women play 
a key role in the construction and perpetuation of masculinity schemas and therefore should be 
included in future studies of conceptions of masculinity. Despite these sample limitations, the 
interviews captured the thoughts and experiences of men of varying socioeconomic status in an 
urban setting and their statements are valuable for examining the relevance of masculinity 
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schemas for fertility in contemporary Malawi. The meanings that they ascribe to various 
masculinity schemas are likely to be shared beyond the confines of this particular neighborhood.  
Another important feature of the qualitative data is that the interviews were conducted by 
young Malawian men in the context of a study related to the prevention of HIV. The interaction 
context likely affected the masculinity schemas invoked by the participants and the positive or 
negative valence attached to each schema. The interview participants most often viewed the 
interviewers as peers, and this may have encouraged greater discussion of the kinds of 
masculinity schemas that are commonly prominent in young male peer networks, such as 
schemas emphasizing sexual promiscuity. Interviewers who shared some social characteristics 
with the participants were selected purposely to increase the participants’ comfort level. On the 
other hand, the context of a Western-funded HIV research study likely meant that social 
desirability promoted discussion of responsibility regarding sexual and fertility behaviors. It is 
always the case that cultural schemas are invoked in a particular context, and while interpreting 
the interview data it is important to remember the context in which the responses were offered. 
With that in mind, I now turn to discussion of the results.  
 
Results 
The men who participated in the in-depth interviews described many masculinity schemas. This 
was consistent with theories of masculinity that hypothesize the existence of multiple 
masculinity schemas within any one social context. Moreover, the responses indicated that men’s 
behaviors are judged against these masculinity schemas. For example, Kingsley (age 28) 
explained, “Being a man does not qualify every man to be called a real man. A real man is 
recognized by what he does.” Men admired their peers who were relatively wealthy and those 
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who had done well in school. Men were also appreciated for being hard working, respectful, and 
religious. There were three common masculinity schemas that directly referenced fertility 
preferences or behaviors in urban Malawi. First, although it was not mentioned often, it was clear 
that real men were expected to father at least one child. Second, men were considered failures 
unless they could provide adequate housing, food, clothing, and school fees for their children. 
Finally, many men were praised for their sexual prowess. The next few sections review evidence 
of these three masculinity schemas and consider their potential relevance to men’s fertility 
preferences and behaviors.  
 
Real Men Father at Least One Child 
While not always explicit in the transcripts, adult men were expected to have at least one child. 
Diston (age 24) said, “A real man is supposed to have at least a child once people get married.” 
Nile (age 25) told a story of one of his friends being mocked because he and his wife had not had 
children. He relayed, “We have our friend who stays down there. He married and five years have 
passed. When he was in a dispute with people, the mockery he was receiving was, ‘Ah, you don't 
bear.’ So, I have seen that that friend was getting to a point of crying, meaning that it was a very 
painful thing, yeah. [The people said,] ‘Ah, you are not a man. You are a woman!’” Nile 
remembered both that the absence of children in a marriage was used as fodder for ridicule and 
that this experience was painful for the man receiving the criticism; the exchange was an 
example of the perpetuation of a masculinity schema through social interaction.  
An equally important social convention that links masculinity with fathering children was 
conveyed by Gideon (age 23). He explained that it is common in Malawi to call a man by his 
first name when he is young and under the care of his parents. Once he is married and has 
 105 
children, it is a sign of respect to call him so-and-so’s father, instead of his first name. Gideon 
said, “If there are children in a family you get respected very much… for the one who has a 
child, when people are passing by on the road they say, ‘The dad for so and so!’ Yeah, ‘The dad 
for so and so!’ But when you don't have a child, whose dad are they going to call you?” In his 
explanation it becomes clear that having a child is intricately linked to achieving the social status 
of adult man.  
While it was important to have at least one child, at the same time interview participants 
indicated that the cultural schema that linked masculinity with having a large number of children 
was viewed as out of date. When asked whether he expected relatives and others to pressure him 
to have more than two children, Solomon (age 18) said, “…those traditional old fashioned things 
where when you have many children you feel like you are a star, no. That one, no.” Many others 
responded as Elias (age 30) did, saying, “things have changed these days. People see that they 
are different from the past.” Ezekiel (age 23) acknowledged and then dismissed this schema by 
saying, “many do admire that this is a real man because ‘apa kubereka, apo kubereka,’ [he bears 
here, he bears there]. Then they say, ‘this one is a real man.’ When [really] it is not like that.” 
Similarly, other respondents implied disapproval of the masculinity schema that encouraged men 
to have many children by associating it with behavior only found among uneducated men in the 
village who were disparaged as Malawi’s past and not its future.  
In summary, in this urban Malawian setting, the schema linking masculinity and 
fatherhood is a powerful model both of and for the world. It defines adult men as men who have 
at least one child and encourages men who are striving to achieve the respect accorded to an 
adult man to father children, especially once they are married. This schema may encourage men 
to try to have their first child shortly after marriage. There is also widespread acknowledgement 
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of a schema linking masculinity with frequent reproduction, but among the young, urban 
interview participants that schema is generally seen as outdated. Only one respondent explicitly 
rejected the idea of limiting his fertility. Instead, as a guide to the proper number of children, a 
vast majority of the interview participants referred to a masculinity schema that associated real 
men with the ability to provide food, clothing, shelter, and school fees for all of their children, as 
discussed in the following section. 
 
Real Men Have Children Who are Well Dressed, Fed, and Going to School 
The majority of the 64 interview participants wanted 2, 3, or 4 children. The average number of 
desired children was just under 3, which is consistent with DHS estimates of desired family size 
among urban, educated men. (Desired family size was not asked in the quantitative survey 
portion of this study.) Respondents described conversations with partners about limiting 
childbearing and conversations with friends about the benefits of lower fertility. They advised 
each other to have the number of children that they could “manage” or the proper number 
“according to your budget.” Respondents often mentioned the “responsibility” that comes with 
having children. 
The masculinity schema that depicted “real men” as those who were able to provide for 
all of the needs of their children was relevant to preferences regarding desired number of 
children. Today, fathers in Africa are increasingly judged not only on the number of children 
they produce, but also on their ability to provide for those children (Morrell and Richter 2006). 
The expectation that men will deliver the financial means to feed, clothe, and school their 
children may seem natural to many readers, but this is a schema of masculinity that has evolved 
over time (Silberschmidt 2001) and become so pervasive that it appears uncontested in many 
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contemporary societies (Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011: 6). Changes in the economic role of children 
are linked to changing cultural expectations of men. The gendered division of labor attributes 
wage-earning responsibilities largely to men (Silberschmidt 2001). Men may be motivated, 
therefore, to have a manageable number of children because of a desire to meet the needs of their 
children, and also because many men perceive that their success as a man will be judged based 
on their ability to provide for their children. The economic well being of the family is interpreted 
using available cultural repertoires, including conceptions of masculinity. 
The masculinity schema emphasizing a man’s responsibility for feeding, clothing, and 
schooling his children is pervasive in the interviews. In fact, it was the least contested and most 
frequently mentioned response to questions about how others evaluate if someone is a “real 
man.” Frank (age 31) responded, “that man is able to take care of his family very well.” Anthony 
(age 22) said that men “admire someone who takes good care of his family.” Boniface (age 21) 
explained what it means that a real man takes care of his family: “If he has children he has to buy 
them clothes, feed them very well. He has to fulfill the desires of the children, like school, 
getting them to be well educated.” Jackson (age 29) provided a more expressive answer: “When 
it is in the village we say, ‘For what should a child cry?’ Meaning that there is everything 
available in the home. So, when it is here in town they do say, ‘This one is a real man.” The 
same expression was used by Henry (age 29) to describe the behavior of a “real man.”  
Isaac (age 22) explicitly linked a man’s ability to earn the admiration of his peers by 
enacting this masculinity schema with the choice to have a small number of children. He said, 
“Like here there are some men who admire their friend’s families or fellow man according to 
how that person is handling issues in his family, in terms of the number of children they have. If 
it is a small number and they are able to provide all the needs for their children… [then] they are 
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able to learn from them.” Nelson (age 27) made a similar remark: “Some do family planning… 
When someone has two children only, who he will be able to support fully, he gets admiration.” 
Joseph (age 29) explained that perceptions of a man’s success would be undermined if he failed 
to care for his children. He said, “to say today they [the children] go to bed while hungry, 
children walking without clothes and doing like that. That means that man is not fit, yeah, sure.” 
All of these interview participants expected that others would evaluate their masculinity based on 
their ability to meet their children’s needs. 
Similarly, when discussing their desired number of children, respondents noted that 
children without proper care were embarrassing to their fathers. Gideon (age 23) explained, 
“Everyone does have children according to how he looks at his future, yeah. Saying, ‘Will I 
manage to dress, care for these children?’ So that when they are moving on the road, they should 
not bring an embarrassment, yeah.” When asked his views about people who have many 
children, Jackson (age 29) said, “It is difficult for one to control all those children; taking care of 
them, sending them to school or providing food for them, yeah. They are embarrassing most of 
the time.” When asked to explain the embarrassment, he said, “other people who look at them 
[your children] do know that you are lacking.”  
Just like married men who have no children, men who cannot provide for their children 
are ridiculed by others. Steven (age 35) said that it is not good to have many children because 
“that can also make people mock you; this one just knows to bear but he doesn't know to take 
care of children [laughter], yeah. So, for your family to be respectable there is need for a man to 
think and look at the size of your family according to your resources so that the family should 
not be seen that there is a problem somewhere.” Later, he continues, “it is better for one to have a 
family that has the number of children that you are very able to take of, rather than for you to 
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have more children but you should fail to take care of them. You strip yourself of respect, you 
make the children suffer.” In the same vein, respondents explained that when people see children 
who haven’t received proper care, they attribute low social status to the children’s father. Edward 
(age 27) said that when the man fails to provide what is needed, “the children are suffering like 
they don't have their father.” Through these explanations, respondents asserted that their 
preference for relatively few children was motivated in part by an understanding that men who 
have children with unmet needs risk ridicule that undermines their masculinity. 
 Overall, in urban Malawi, masculine ideals that emphasized men as providers were a 
potentially important ideational influence encouraging men to limit their fertility. Masculinity 
schemas provide powerful incentives to father children, but not too many children. Among the 
respondents, the stated desire to limit childbearing was not based purely on rational economic 
calculus; it was also informed by a masculinity schema that attributed success only to those men 
who were able to provide for their children. Conceptions of masculinity were an important lens 
through which economic and social conditions were evaluated.  
Before continuing, it is important to note that both of the masculinity schemas reviewed 
so far speak most directly to men’s fertility preferences. Conceptions of what makes a “real 
man” encourage men to have at least one, but not too many children. Such schemas will likely be 
activated by surveys that ask about desired family size. They may also influence decisions 
regarding the use of relatively long-term contraceptive methods. These masculinity schemas, 
however, are less immediately relevant to some of the proximate behaviors—including sexual 
practices and condom use—that lead to the conception (or not) of children. In other words, these 
schemas may not always be highly salient in the moment when men must make decisions about 
sex, and it is precisely during such “conjunctures” when schemas may be activated to guide 
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behaviors (Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011). The third masculinity schema that was frequently 
mentioned by interview participants is perhaps more likely to be employed in such situations. 
This schema is discussed next.  
 
Real Men are Sexually Active 
The third masculinity schema that was frequently repeated in the interviews, and has relevance to 
the study of fertility, emphasized sexual prowess and promiscuity. According to this schema, 
masculine men have large sexual appetites and have sex often and with many different women. 
Some men described sexual behaviors as a legitimate measure of masculinity, while others 
acknowledged but rejected the schema linking sexual prowess and masculinity. In the 
quantitative data, 63 percent of the full study sample (approximately 1,250 men) agreed or 
partially agreed that “men are always ready to have sex.” Even more striking, 80 percent agreed 
or partially agreed that “a man needs other women, even if things are fine with his wife.” These 
survey results are evidence of the prevalence and the power of this masculinity schema.  
 The schema is evident in the interview data as well. When asked what makes others 
consider someone a real man, many respondents talked about sexual behaviors. For example, 
Francis (age 23) said, “Ah, what I know when they say a real man, [it] is someone who knows or 
likes to sleep around with women. Then they say this one is a real man.” Similarly, Robert (age 
20) replied, “When they say this one is a real man, it’s like that man likes women… [he has] 
several girlfriends.” Goodwin (age 30) explained, “So when they say, ‘this one is a man.’ Then I 
look at them to say, ‘what do they do?’ Then I find out, of course they have money, but the main 
thing is that the man changes women a lot [has sex with several women].” Martin (age 33) gave 
a similar explanation: “These are admired because you go this way, you find that they are with a 
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woman, and you go the other way and you find that they are with a different type of woman and 
we just say that they are really into it [sex] and they are admired for that.” For all of these 
respondents, and many others, men assert their masculinity by having lots of sex with lots of 
women.  
 Often the root of this masculinity schema seemed to be that men were expected to have 
insatiable sexual appetites and to constantly strive for sexual pleasure. Sometimes the responses 
linking masculinity and sexual promiscuity also contained suggestions that having many sexual 
partners was a way of demonstrating domination over women, which was why it was interpreted 
as masculine behavior. After explaining that some men admire peers who have sex with many 
women, John (age 33) gave an example of a friend who wanted a car so that he could attract 
women. John quoted his friend saying, “He said the key to defeating them [women] is having a 
car, so that once they see a car they will be cheated [think you are wealthy] and you will have it 
[sex] the easy way.” The friend continued, “We need not be gentle to them.” John’s friend was 
rhetorically demonstrating his masculinity by simultaneously claiming a strong sexual appetite 
and a desire to “defeat” women.  
 This link between multiple sexual partners and efforts to enact masculinity by dominating 
women was also mentioned by Nathaniel and Diston, both of whom described this behavior as 
common but ill-advised. Nathaniel (age 34) explained that some of his peers think a man shows 
he is a “real man” by disobeying his wife’s preference that he remain faithful within marriage, 
thereby asserting his dominance within his household. He said, “When one has paid attention to 
his wife or listens to his wife, they seem like they are stupid because they pay attention to their 
wives… It is when men are able to make a decision on their own, then they are taken as real men 
because they do not listen to what their wives are saying or contributing.” Later he continues, 
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“Any problem that you encounter at your home, when you go for girlfriends, fellow men think 
that that is the best way of getting back at the wife so that she should be fearful.” This sentiment 
is echoed by Diston (age 24) who said, “Once there is the smallest misunderstanding [men] opt 
to have a girlfriend outside marriage… Some men admire that, and they encourage each other 
saying, ‘do not be lenient to her. If she misbehaves, go for someone else.’ A lot of men consider 
that as a life worth admiring.” These explanations suggest that frequent sex with multiple 
partners is viewed as masculine behavior because it demonstrates both a strong sexual appetite 
and the domination of women.  
If the men who assert their masculinity by having many girlfriends opt to forgo 
contraception, these behavioral choices may have implications for fertility. Male condoms are 
the most commonly used contraceptive method among unmarried men and women in Malawi 
(National Statistical Office [Malawi] and ICF Macro 2011), but they are disliked and avoided by 
many potential users. Malawians often prefer not to use condoms because they destroy the 
“sweetness” and the pleasure of sex (Watkins 2004). Peter (age 24) underlined this problem, 
saying, “A lot of young men hate using condoms because they do not feel anything.” Moreover, 
other studies have identified a cultural script that links masculinity and sex without condoms 
(Kaler 2003; Simpson 2007). In short, combined with an avoidance of contraception, the 
masculinity schema that encourages frequent sex with many partners has the potential to affect 
fertility in urban Malawi. 
While discussing this masculinity schema that rewards sexual prowess, it is important to 
also mention that while the schema was recognized by almost all interview respondents, it was 
also rejected by many of them. Men who rejected sexual prowess as a marker of masculinity 
proposed other definitions of what makes someone a “real man.” For example, Jeremiah (age 30) 
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said, “Right now people are being respected for the wrong things, like a married man having 
three girlfriends, while someone who is a religious man and they have a respectable job, it is 
difficult for them to be respected.” He acknowledged and disapproved of the schema linking 
masculinity and sexual prowess. To him, men should earn respect by being religious and hard 
working. Gift’s (age 18) response showed that some young men also express this ambivalence. 
He explained that among the youth, success with girls is admired: “maybe girls like him very 
much, so they say, ‘eeh, that one is a real man.” He continues, “that’s how we cheat one another, 
but that is wrong.” Later he says that some of his peers admire those who “abstain themselves 
from things concerning girls.” These men believed that the masculinity schema that encouraged 
men to have multiple partners was harmful. For many, the rejection of sexual prowess as a 
marker of masculinity is tied to the devastation caused by HIV/AIDS. Even Francis (age 23), 
who himself earned praise because of his promiscuity, saw that this masculinity schema was a 
double-edged sword. He noted that his friends, “they do praise me on one side, but on the other 
they revile me.” When asked why they revile him, he explained, “They say I will die young.” 
The fact that many respondents felt the need to explicitly reject the privileging of sexual prowess 
as the definition of masculinity, however, speaks to the power and pervasiveness of this cultural 
schema. 
After rejecting sexual prowess as a marker of status, some men constructed an alternate 
masculinity schema that emphasized a man’s responsibility to care for his family and remain 
faithful to his wife. Jeremiah (age 30) said that a “real man” is “…someone who knows his 
responsibilities, someone who knows that he is on earth so as to take care of his family and his 
children, including his relatives. Not someone who wants to have several women.” Joshua (age 
21) said that others express admiration “when they see that the man takes care of his family and 
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he does not have extra-marital affairs.” These men favored a masculinity schema that privileged 
responsibility. Men who base their behaviors on this alternate masculinity schema are likely to 
only have children within marriage and to limit their childbearing to the number of children they 
can adequately support. As such, this schema may also have implications for men’s fertility. The 
next section provides a broader examination of how researchers can think about the relationship 
between these three masculinity schemas and fertility behaviors.   
 
Linking Schemas and Behaviors 
The data collected in this study enable examination of the masculinity schemas that are prevalent 
in contemporary urban Malawi. The study was not designed to capture the ways in which the 
enactment of those schemas may influence behavior. As a guide to future research, however, it is 
important to hypothesize about how masculinity schemas may affect fertility outcomes, which is 
the purpose of this section. Because this study was designed to investigate individual beliefs and 
behaviors, I focus here on how research on masculinity schemas may contribute to our 
understanding of individual-level variation in fertility outcomes.  
In the current study site, where everyone had knowledge of all three masculinity 
schemas, variation in fertility preferences and behaviors was unlikely to be explained by variable 
familiarity with the masculinity schemas. Instead, variation mainly derived from two sources. 
First, while access may have been relatively uniform, different men had different attitudes 
toward each of the masculinity schemas. Second, resources were required to enact masculinity 
schemas and the necessary resources were unevenly distributed across the population. The next 
few paragraphs provide examples of variation from each of these sources.  
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Variable endorsement of the masculinity schemas emerged most clearly in the interview 
transcripts with regards to the schema linking masculinity and sexual prowess. Some men aspire 
to enact this masculinity schema. For example, Adam (age 27) described a conversation among 
his friends that he had the day before the interview. He explained that they were asking each 
other how many women they had had sex with and boasting in their responses. Someone in the 
conversation began summarizing their “achievements” by describing the type of vehicle they 
could fill with women who had been their sexual partners. Adam reported that his friend said, 
“you filled an AXA [72 seater bus]. Ah, you, a minibus.” In that exchange, Adam and his friends 
demonstrated endorsement of the schema linking masculinity and sexual promiscuity (also see 
Kaler 2003). As discussed above, others in the sample had much more negative reactions to this 
schema. Josiah (age 34) exemplified this view, saying, “it cannot be possible to earn admiration 
just because you have so many sexual partners, so many girlfriends… you should just have your 
wife.” In sum, some men in the sample expressed positive attitudes and others negative attitudes 
about sexual promiscuity as a marker of masculinity.  
Additionally, the quantitative data captured variation in attitudes about the schema 
linking masculinity and sexual promiscuity. Some of the survey items from the GEM scale 
required respondents to indicate their level of agreement with statements that assessed the 
centrality of sexual exploits to manliness, including, “A man needs other women, even if things 
are fine with his wife;” “Men are always ready to have sex;” and “Men need sex more than 
women do.” Other items assessed the degree to which men felt entitled to control sexual 
encounters, such as “It is the man who decides when to have sex” and “You don’t talk about sex, 
you just do it.” Respondents were asked whether they agreed, partially agreed, or disagreed with 
each of these statements. The number of items with which the respondent disagreed was summed 
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to create a scale score ranging from 0 to 5. Respondents who disagreed with many of the items 
were essentially rejecting the masculinity schema that emphasizes sexual prowess and male 
dominance in sexual encounters.  
The wide distribution of the scale scores is shown in Figure 4.1, demonstrating variable 
endorsement of this masculinity schema. Analyses of the quantitative data (not shown) also 
indicated that men who rejected sexual prowess as a marker of masculinity were relatively less 
likely to have fathered children by 
their early twenties. Although the 
data do not permit causal 
inference, we can hypothesize that 
men who rejected the schema 
linking masculinity and sexual 
promiscuity may have been less 
likely to have multiple sex 
partners, sex without 
contraception, and early initiation of sex. In other words, variable commitment to enacting this 
masculinity schema may be part of the explanation for variation in fertility outcomes. 
A second source of variation stems from the uneven distribution of resources for enacting 
various masculinity schemas. Different schemas require different resources. For example, young 
unmarried men without children are unable to demonstrate their masculinity by providing for a 
family. Similarly, unemployed men may have trouble meeting the standard implied by the 
schema linking masculinity with children who are clothed, fed, and going to school. These men 






















Greater Rejection of Masculinity as Sexual Prowess 
Figure 4.1 Masculinity Scale Score 
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hypothesis, in a study of Malawian youth, Izugbara and Undie (2008) find that for young men of 
relatively low social status, boasting about sexual promiscuity is central to their achievement of a 
masculine identity. On the other hand, men with greater financial resources may have more luck 
attracting multiple sexual partners, thereby demonstrating their masculinity through both their 
wealth and their sexual prowess.  
 Education may also be an important resource for enacting various masculinity schemas. 
Education can provide a source of social status that is unrelated to childbearing. Men who 
achieve relatively high educational attainment can rely on their educational success to establish 
their masculinity and may feel less social pressure to prove their masculinity through 
procreation. As explained by Basu (1999: 283), “the prestige of education [is] able to 
compensate for the loss of status associated with low fertility in uneducated families.” In other 
words, educated men have more choices about how to assert their success and their masculinity 
(Connell 1995). Educational achievement may alleviate the pressure felt by some men to father 
children as evidence of their masculinity. As these examples illustrate, men with different 
resources will differ in their ability to enact each masculinity schema and this may lead to 
variation in fertility outcomes.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study investigated the masculinity schemas prevalent among young urban Malawian men. 
Masculinity schemas are mental representations—such as ideals, values, and beliefs—that 
provide guides for action based on shared expectations for how men should behave. Masculinity 
is not automatically ascribed to all men; instead, men assert their manhood by enacting 
masculinity schemas. 
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The interview data presented above show that several of the masculinity schemas 
prevalent in contemporary urban Malawi associate certain fertility behaviors with manliness. 
Adult men are expected to father at least one child. At the same time, men are socially rewarded 
for having only the number of children they can afford to clothe, feed, and send to school. 
Having sex with many women is also commonly acknowledged as masculine behavior. Each of 
these schemas was widely recognized among the study population. 
 These data document evidence that masculinity schemas are imbued with beliefs relevant 
to fertility preferences and behaviors. This is the first step in investigating masculinity schemas 
as an ideational influence on fertility outcomes. Theories of masculinity argue that men enact 
available schemas to build their sense of manhood and to perform their masculinity for others. If 
these schemas are acting as mental maps for action, then they may provide important motivation 
for decisions affecting fertility. Perceptions of what kind of behavior is masculine can affect 
fertility preferences, as well as more proximate determinants of fertility, such as choice and 
number of partners, access to information about contraception, and willingness to use 
contraception. Future research on masculinity schemas has the potential to illuminate reasons for 
differences in fertility outcomes between individuals, as well as between communities and within 
communities across time. 
 At the individual level, research that explores links between masculinity schemas and 
fertility outcomes should be part of the response to recent calls for investigation of factors that 
shape men’s fertility preferences and behaviors (Agadjanian 2002). Data from this study suggest 
that variation in desire and ability to enact each masculinity schema may lead to variation in 
fertility outcomes. Varying levels of endorsement of each schema may explain some differences 
 119 
in behavioral choices. Additionally, unequal distribution of resources leads to differential ability 
to perform each masculinity schema, and perhaps to different fertility outcomes.   
 At the community level, studies of masculinity schemas may illuminate differences in 
fertility over time. As discussed above, the prevalence and popularity of masculinity schemas are 
expected to change gradually over time. This may be an important part of the explanation for 
large-scale fertility trends. Some of the interview participants hinted at this process when they 
described the schema linking masculinity with fathering many children as outdated. The 
popularity of that schema in urban Malawi has waned as social and economic conditions have 
changed and cultural shifts meant that men gained primary responsibility for earning sufficient 
wages to provide for their family (Silberschmidt 2001). Data from this cross-sectional study are 
not well-suited to examine variation over time, however other studies have explored those kinds 
of macro historical trends in conceptions of masculinity (Phiri 1983; Vaughan 1987; Davison 
1993; Morrell 2001; Pattman 2001; Silberschmidt 2001; Praz 2007; Hunter 2010). Fertility 
research could benefit from further examination of historical shifts in masculinity schemas. 
 Finally, inter-community differences in masculinity schemas could be part of the 
explanation for variation in fertility outcomes across communities. The limited scope of this 
study means that the data are not appropriate for between community comparisons. There is 
suggestive evidence in existing literature, however, that illustrates how masculinity schemas may 
contribute to inter-community differences in fertility outcomes. For example, Hollos and Larsen 
(2004) describe two different types of marital relations evident in the Pare community in 
northern Tanzania. They find that men in compassionate marriages desire fewer children than 
those in male-dominant marriages. They conclude, “It is our contention that men do not simply 
calculate the ‘utility value’ of children but think about marriage and childbearing as part of a 
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‘whole package’ in which individual life paths are informed at least partially by the ideas of a 
good or desirable life of the cultural group in which they live” (Hollos and Larsen 2004: 1748). 
Although they do not state so explicitly, the different conceptions of a desirable life course that 
they describe are fundamentally linked to two different conceptions of what it means to be a 
man. They identify two different collective constructions of masculinity and demonstrate that 
those cultural schemas are associated with men’s fertility preferences and behaviors. In general, 
differences between communities in the types of fertility behaviors that are commonly viewed as 
masculine may be part of the explanation for inter-community differences in fertility outcomes.   
This proposed research agenda entails many challenges. The interplay between structural 
and ideational factors is cyclical. Reproductive choices are influenced by conceptions of 
masculinity, and at the same time reproductive choices influence the construction of what is 
masculine (Agadjanian 2001; Watkins et al. 1997; Allendorf 2012). Moreover, masculinity 
schemas cannot be studied apart from the larger gender systems in which they are embedded. 
The relative structural positions of men and women interact with schemas of masculinity (and 
femininity) to shape the context for individual actions. And finally, masculinity schemas will be 
meaningfully activated to guide behaviors at “conjunctures” (Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011) when 
individuals are faced with behavioral decisions. This means that in addition to studies that 
identify variable endorsement of schemas, fertility research would also benefit from in-depth 
studies that are attentive to the specific contexts in which masculinity schemas are activated.  
Nevertheless, these challenges should not stand in the way of valuable research. The data 
presented in this paper show clearly that masculinity schemas are imbued with beliefs that are 
relevant to fertility preferences and behaviors. Additional research is needed to determine if and 





The three empirical chapters of this dissertation all investigate ideational aspects of 
gender systems. The first paper documented evidence of global influence on individual gender 
schemas. The second paper showed that Malawian men’s attitudes about common gender 
schemas are related to their sexual health behaviors and their self-assessed risk of HIV. The final 
paper demonstrated that gender schemas that are common in contemporary urban Malawi are 
imbued with ideals relevant to men’s fertility preferences and behaviors. Each of these studies 
provides strong initial evidence of associations that inspire many additional research questions 
and encourage the expansion of this type of research to other contexts.  
Chapter 2, “Increasing Rejection of Intimate Partner Violence: Evidence of Global 
Cultural Diffusion,” shows that trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence are consistent 
with the influence of global norms. The findings lead to questions about the avenues of diffusion 
that link individuals in low-income countries with gender schemas of the international 
community. They also encourage more in-depth research on when and how global norms are 
adopted, resisted, modified, and rejected by local actors working within their own cultural logics. 
Finally, the results provide motivation for further research on the behavioral effects of recent 
changes in gender attitudes. Additional research is needed in order to better understand whether 
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the trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence have any effect on the perpetration of such 
violence or on gender relations more broadly.  
There are important lessons learned from this study for both researchers and policy 
makers. Scholars studying gender schemas must be attentive to the influence of global forces on 
local attitudes and beliefs. For qualitative researchers, for example, this means paying attention 
to individual perceptions of the origins of specific gender schemas and how the perceived origins 
influence the ways in which those schemas are invoked. Quantitative researchers should be 
careful about the potential influence of social desirability bias on responses to survey questions 
that reference global gender schemas. Policy makers should be somewhat encouraged by the 
finding that global attention to the issue of violence against women is having an effect on 
individual attitudes. At the same time, however, they must insist on additional research that tests 
the effectiveness of various diffusion mechanisms and should demand examination of whether 
there is a link between changing attitudes and changing behaviors.  
Chapter 3, “Men’s Gender Attitudes and HIV Risk,” demonstrates that there is an 
association between gender attitudes and sexual health behaviors among young men in urban 
Malawi. The data are not sufficient, however, to test whether this is a causal connection. Much 
more research is needed to investigate whether changing gender attitudes leads to changes in 
sexual health. Also, the data only include measures of individual gender attitudes, but since 
gender schemas are shared understandings, the results inspire additional questions about the 
relative influence of individual gender attitudes versus community-level gender schemas on 
sexual health behaviors. As answers to these additional questions are pursued, the populations 
under study must also be expanded because constructions of gender are context specific and 
findings from one sample cannot be generalized.  
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The results have several implications for researchers and policy makers. First, for 
researchers, the study adds to a growing body of evidence that individual gender attitudes can be 
measured using quantitative survey methodologies. Much of the research in sociology on gender 
schemas relies on qualitative data collection. While the measurements used in this study are far 
from perfect, they demonstrate that the study of the ideational aspects of gender systems need not 
be left to those using qualitative research methods. For policy makers, the study findings show 
that recent attention to gender schemas in reproductive health programming is warranted. Given 
that this is a relatively new type of programming, implementers should include rigorous 
evaluations of their programs that are designed to influence gender attitudes and thereby change 
sexual health behaviors.  
Chapter 4, “ ‘A Real Man is Recognized by What He Does’: Schemas of Masculinity and 
Fertility,” issues a call for research on the relationship between masculinity schemas and men’s 
fertility preferences and behaviors. The paper documents that, in urban Malawi, masculinity 
schemas are a source of cultural scripts available to guide men’s fertility. Additional research is 
needed to test whether these gender schemas do indeed influence men’s preferences and 
behavioral choices regarding reproduction. The findings also inspire questions about whether 
shifting conceptions of masculinity have played a role in historical fertility transitions, or 
whether they will influence future fertility trends. Finally, cross-cultural comparisons of the 
relationship between masculinity schemas and fertility behavior would further enhance our 
understanding of this social process.  
For both researchers and policy makers, the main lesson learned from the analysis in the 
final empirical chapter is that masculinity schemas are relevant to discussions about fertility. 
Policy makers who promote family planning must consider masculinity schemas as a potentially 
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important source of motivation for men’s fertility behaviors. Programs encouraging the use of 
contraception, birth spacing, and couple communication about reproduction will likely be more 
effective if the influence of social norms regarding masculinity (and femininity) is taken into 
account. 
In summary, while the conclusions that can be drawn from these empirical investigations 
are necessarily limited in scope, together the three studies illustrate the potential importance of 
ideational aspects of gender systems for understanding social processes and individual behaviors. 
Persistent gender inequality is supported by systems of beliefs and values that legitimate that 
inequality. Past research has documented the contribution of structural gender inequalities to 
negative health and demographic outcomes. Additional research is needed to further investigate 
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